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 Abstract 
This working paper addresses two dimensions in which transnational or supranational regulatory 
regimes may be regarded as self-sufficient, providing some reasons, limits and pitfalls from such a 
tendency.  The focus of both parts is on competition policy, which is of particular importance because 
of its transversal character:  the fact that it can be applied in many if not all markets means that 
competition policy is a useful tool for market opening/integration and is likely to create conflicts with 
different policy objectives pursued in various market settings.  Moreover, competition policy often 
acts as a trump on ordinary private law principles and can be used by administrative actors to 
substantially re-order private relationships. 
The first section focuses on the regulatory network and the idea of its self-sufficiency as a regulatory 
club for the self-enforcement of commonly agreed-upon norms independent of any formal mechanism 
for enforcement or dispute resolution within the network.  As such, national regulators may develop 
obligations qua club members, distancing themselves from national communities.  Yet the paper seeks 
to show that even informal enforcement requires mechanisms for making the actions of national 
administrations observable and characterisable.  While mechanisms that perform that function have 
been observed in some EU networked regimes, these can be used either to enforce a hierarchical EU 
intrusion into national legal orders or to stimulate learning from divergent approaches stemming from 
persistent heterogeneity within the EU; it is an empirical research question to determine which is a 
better characterisation of the networked regulatory regimes. 
The second section focuses on self-sufficiency by way of a narrow definition of the policy mandate of 
legal and regulatory regimes, i.e. the idea of the instrumentalisation of a branch of the law for the 
achievement of a particular policy objective.  This type of mandate definition can have a number of 
advantages:  concentrating on a narrowly defined mandate can increase the likelihood of achieving it, 
it can allow for the proper sequencing of different policy tools where some objectives need to be 
prioritised and in a multi-level environment it can allow for the allocation of policy tools to different 
levels.  Yet, by reference to the relationship between competition policy and social policy objectives, 
the second part highlights some of the risks involved in building such self-standing regimes, including 
the development of rationalities and institutional habits that are difficult to dislodge even in the face of 
absence of success in achieving (or better yet trading off) the myriad objectives of public policy. 
Keywords 
regulatory networks, private law, informal enforcement, competition policy, social objectives, 
development, self-sufficiency 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Yane Svetiev
* 
 
There is little dispute that EU law has increasingly sought to directly regulate relationships between 
private actors in advancing integration and other objectives leading in turn to a body of law that has 
come to be recognised as European private law.  In considering the relationship between this new 
body of law and traditional national private law, one possible scenario is that EU private law emerges 
as a largely autonomous body of norms, operating relatively independently from national private law 
and its institutions.  One possible reason for such a development might be the sometimes quoted 
principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, which in turn leads to considerable diversity 
in their private law regimes and institutions.  By contrast, even in its private law dimension, EU 
intervention increasingly relies on the national administrations.  In fields such as competition (which is 
transversal and particularly important in the networked services sectors), telecommunications, energy, 
food safety, financial market regulation and others, rather than expanding the reach of the Brussels 
bureaucracy we observe the networking of national administrations, together with the Commission.   
The emphasis on the creation of regulators, networking those regulators across state boundaries and an 
expanding role of such administrative bodies in steering private relationships (between incumbents 
and entrants or between suppliers and consumers for example) in various markets could suggest an 
erosion of the autonomy of the Member States and their own private law (which is presumed to be 
democratically legitimated) and an erosion of private party autonomy which traditional private law 
sought to facilitate.  Moreover, such a development could also lead to the emergence of a self-standing 
European private law for at least two reasons, each of which is explored in the following two sections 
of this paper. 
The first reason is that the joining of the national administrations together with the Commission in EU 
networks can provide an alternative mechanism for the enforcement of EU norms, which is certainly 
procedurally less onerous and less costly compared to enforcement proceedings before the EU courts, 
where a Member State fails to implement the formal obligations of EU law.  Further, making 
distinctions as between national legal systems or suggesting that national courts or judicatures provide 
inadequate legal protection for EU law rights is politically much more challenging and sensitive for 
the EU institutions.  While most of the EU networked regimes do not have formal enforcement 
mechanisms through which the national administrations can be disciplined, this does not necessarily 
mean that other mechanisms for enforcement could be effective in these regulatory clubs.  Slaughter, 
in her seminal analysis of transnational regulatory networks, has suggested that informal mechanisms 
of enforcement, such as reputation, ostracism or socialisation could be operative and more effective 
among members of such networks
1
. 
The first part of this working paper seeks to examine the extent to which the various informal 
mechanisms, following the taxonomy provided by Jon Elster
2
, are likely to emerge in the context of a 
transnational regulatory network to ensure the enforcement of common norms.  The conclusion is that 
none of the informal mechanisms offered by Elster is likely to be particularly effective in the 
regulatory network context, not least because of the absence of mechanisms for making the actions of 
participating administrations observable and characterisable to the rest of the membership.  Moreover, 
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such mechanisms are necessary both to ensure effective learning across different network members or, 
for that matter, for an effective mechanism of formal norm enforcement. 
It is worth noting that in the EU context, we can observe some formalisation of mechanisms for the 
observability and characterisation of the activities of national regulators to all network members.  Thus 
in the ECN context, as I have pointed out in prior work
3
, there has been formalised a mechanism for 
the reporting of cases pursued under EU law to the ECN.  Furthermore, we observe the creation of 
network bodies of peer review in which the actions of the member bodies can be discussed and 
characterised vis-à-vis the common norms.  As the first section of this paper illustrates, however, such 
mechanisms can have multiple rationales and effects (and the latter need not coincide with the former).  
They can indeed be used both for the hierarchical imposition of norms (thus contributing towards the 
emergence of a self-sufficient EU regulatory private law), but they could also be used for mutual 
learning, where the administrations are allowed considerable autonomy in crafting their enforcement 
activity and how they involve private parties in such activities (where EU norms emerge through a 
more bottom-up process to which national administrations and even courts are active contributors).  
Which one of those scenarios is a better characterisation of the process is precisely one important 
question that should be the subject of the empirical research. 
There is a second way in which the networking of the national administrations together with the 
Commission can lead to the emergence of a self-standing EU law, including in its private dimension.  
Specifically, this can be the result of a narrow definition of the mandate of European regulatory 
interventions, which in turn is then “internalised” in the decision-making and analytic procedures of 
the national administrations.  The second section of this paper analyses precisely the problem of the 
narrow instrumentalisation of regulatory mandates in transnational or supranational regimes.  One 
reason for such a narrow definition of the mandate can be that of sequencing:  the idea that one 
particular goal is more important than another and that regulation pursuing the second goal should 
await the achievement of the first.  In the EU we can observe such a tendency, where for example it is 
often argued that EU interventions have a neoliberal flavour because the EU prioritises the 
achievement of the internal market objectives (through fostering cross-border competition) vis-à-vis 
other regulatory objectives (such as, most prominently, social objectives where any joint action was 
delayed for a later stage of integration, in an interesting inversion to the suggestions of some 
development economists in the example from the transnational context discussed in the second part of 
this working paper).  In the EU such narrow mandates can also be underpinned by subsidiarity 
concerns: certain types of policy are to be pursued at the national level both because this is part of the 
EU constitutional bargain and because policies promoting social objectives are more legitimately put 
in place by the national democratically elected legislatures. 
By using as an example the question of the appropriate sequencing for the implementation of 
competition policy vis-à-vis developmental and social goals in the transnational setting, the second 
section of this working paper examines some of the dangers inherent in the development of self-
sufficient narrow mandate regulatory interventions.  Specifically, building narrow-mandate 
bureaucracies could mean that jurisdictions are locked into a single strategy for the pursuit of specific 
policy objectives.  This can be problematic if the strategy turns out to be wrong, such as if the narrow-
mandate regulator completely misses a specific dimension of the problem.  It can also be problematic 
due to the isolated silo effect, whereby the narrow mandate regulator ends up working at cross-
purposes with a different regulator in charge of a different regulatory task or objective.  Furthermore, 
narrow definition of the regulatory objectives can lead to the emergence of organisational habits, in the 
way of decision-making and analytic procedures, that are particularly difficult to dislodge.  Thus, the 
single-headed pursuit of the goal of cross-border competition can lead to procedures that effectively 
pursue that (intermediate) goal, while at the same time leaving in the bureaucratic blindspot the overall 
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goals of public policy.  Similarly, industrial policy in support of domestic champions can both leave 
domestic markets at the mercy of monopolists or can effectively eliminate all sources of independent 
learning needed to assess the efficacy of such policies vis-à-vis the overall public interest.  This kind 
of implementation can lead precisely to the development of a specific “rationality” of a legal or 
administrative regime, and at the same time denying the regime the capacity to overcome even in the 
face of overall failure.  This kind of implementation can also produce a strong form of, what the 
literature has termed, “diagonal conflict” cases4, while at the same time the regulatory silos can 
prevent the effective proceduralisation and accommodation of such conflicts. 
Again, coming back to the EU context this issue is particularly important.  If indeed EU interventions, 
now also intruding deeply into horizontal private relationships, have a narrow mandate and a specific 
rationality and if such a rationality is now ensnaring national actors and institutions, this can have 
particularly deleterious consequences as it extinguishes the tools for the pursuit of a diversity of public 
policy objectives at the altar of liberalisation.  Thus it has been suggested that the self-sufficiency of 
European Regulatory Private Law may act in a “dystopian” way5.  In that context, the fact that the 
negative integration objectives were prioritised and were to be sequenced before other objectives, such 
as social ones, could lead to pessimism about the capacity of European institutions to disrupt this self-
description of their mandate to pursue a more balanced set of policy objectives.  This is at least one 
common characterisation of a raft of recent private law decisions of the ECJ on the balance between 
the (negative) economic freedoms and the protective provisions of national labour law.  And 
competition policy, discussed in this part, is particularly important in this interpretation as it was used 
as one of the principal instruments for promoting market integration via cross-border competition and 
distribution. 
Again, however, the situation is more complex and the question whether EU private law is self-
sufficient in its definition of its “rationality” is a question that requires empirical research.  There are 
at least two pieces of evidence suggesting that the view of EU intervention as having a neoliberal 
rationality may be too narrow.  One is in the area of competition law and state aid, where EU 
institutions have already demonstrated a capacity to go beyond the narrow pursuit of cross-border 
competition to a more encompassing definition of the objectives of competition policy to include 
complex goals such as innovation.  The state aid component of competition policy goes perhaps even 
further in identifying broader legitimate goals of government policy, while offering Member States 
and EU institutions procedural tools for gauging the achievement of such goals.  Similarly, in the 
design of the networked regulatory regimes for the public utilities, such as energy or 
telecommunications, we see the incorporation of the objective of consumer protection into the overall 
mandate of those regimes
6
.  Perhaps this reflects the growing recognition that the process of 
liberalisation was not one some simple idea of “unleashing” competitive market forces, but in fact was 
and continues to be a process of the design of markets that both tap into and constrain the autonomy of 
private actors in ways that promote some broad conception of the public interest.  Such a recognition 
can be liberating, in that it dislodges the focus on the intermediate objectives (liberalisation) in the 
hope that this produces good outcomes for business and consumers, and refocuses attention on the 
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5
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6
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specific features that can be incorporated into the market design
7
 to ensure a more balanced pursuit of 
the interests of various market participants. 
                                                     
7
 Used here in the way attributed to some Ordoliberals, see Joerges, 2006, “La constitution économique européenne en 
processus et en process”, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique XX(3): 253; Colliat, 2012, “A Critical Genealogy of 
European Macroeconomic Governance”, European Law Journal 18(1): 6, 7-8. 
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I.  SELF-SUFFICIENCY AS INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT IN THE REGULATORY NETWORK 
Introduction 
Regulatory networks increasingly populate the European regulatory landscape.  In various both 
horizontal enforcement regimes (such as competition or antidiscrimination) as well as vertical sectoral 
regimes (telecommunications, energy, food safety, financial services) we observe the creation of EU 
networks encompassing the national regulatory agencies and sometimes incorporating also the 
European Commission (as in the case of the competition network for example).  While some aspects 
of the networks are formalised and sometimes the network bodies are given certain formal powers 
(limited of course by the Meroni doctrine), much of their operation proceeds through consultation and 
discussion, taking place in issue-based working groups and beyond the radar screen. 
Similarly, a key aspect of the shift towards informal mechanisms for elaborating and enforcing 
international legal norms has been the proliferation of transnational regulatory networks (TRN) in 
various policy fields. Such networks have been formed in preference to traditional regimes based on 
international treaties and organisations in charge of enforcing them, and they have been formed with 
respect to many different regulatory and enforcement issues at both the regional and global levels. In 
fact, precisely because of their informal character and because they do not follow a particular pattern 
or template either for their organisation or for the mechanisms through which they operate, it is said to 
be impossible to provide an exhaustive list of such transnational networks in existence at any 
particular point in time. 
Given this trend observed over the past few decades, a number of scholars have explored the reasons 
for the formation of such networks and have sought to provide at least a preliminary assessment of 
these new instruments compared to more traditional tools of international law.  
In particular, in her seminal contribution, Slaughter argued that the networked regimes were an 
improvement on the standard toolkit for international cooperation and that transnational networks 
provide the construct for the ‘new world order’.1 
Moreover, in this and other early contributions, she argued that networked regimes had the potential to 
deliver a more effective, legitimate, and just world order compared to the standard treaty/organisation 
paradigm. Other scholars also examined the operations of some networked regimes and provided 
evidence that despite their informality, their distance from elected politics and the absence of formal 
enforcement mechanisms, TRNs were capable of delivering satisfactory levels of cooperation, 
compliance, and policy outcomes.
2
 
However, both in light of the optimistic tenor of the early literature and the fact that these types of 
transnational fora have since proliferated even more rapidly at all levels of a multi-level world, more 
recent scholarly interest has shifted towards evaluation of TRNs and understanding precisely the kinds 
of outcomes that these networks deliver both at the international and the local level. Apart from 
providing an occasion for international travel and mutual interaction for the officials involved, do 
TRNs serve any useful public interest? Do they contribute to the elaboration and implementation of 
international norms and are such norms effective and legitimate? And even if not, do they serve some 
                                                     
 A revised version published as “The Limits of Informal Law-Making: Enforcement, Norm-generation and Learning in the 
ICN”, in Informal International Law-Making (Joost Pauwelyn, Jan Wouters & Ramses Wessel, eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
1
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2004). 
2
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other public enhancing purpose either for the domestic publics of the regulatory agencies or for the 
international community as a whole? One aim of such inquiry might be to answer the question whether 
these networks are worth the trouble and expense of their formation and ongoing maintenance. 
Moreover, even if we think that either a return towards the classical (treaty/organisation) model or a 
lurch towards a global State is unlikely, this type of inquiry may provide guidance on how to improve 
the architecture of such networks so as to enhance their efficacy and legitimacy by identifying network 
features and architectures that work better than others. 
This paper stems from a more substantive effort to examine and evaluate the modes of cooperation of 
the International Competition Network (ICN) with the view of working towards a framework for the 
evaluation of TRNs more broadly. The ICN is a broad-based network open to all competition (or 
antitrust) enforcement agencies around the world.
3
 From the perspective of assessing the challenges of 
informality in the ‘new’ international law, the ICN provides an interesting case for a number of 
reasons. First, the ICN came into existence and held its first meeting in 2002, after the failure of 
numerous attempts over the course of the 20
th
 century to develop an international antitrust instrument 
by way of a treaty. In light of such failures, and in light of the fact that no consensus could be reached 
for even a minimal harmonisation of competition rules as part of the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations, the ICN was from the outset and very deliberately a highly informal and unambitious 
network.
4
 It was to have a minimal infrastructure, it is peripatetic (with no permanent seat), it has very 
few rules of engagement, and any object of developing an antitrust code for the world was 
categorically disclaimed at its conception.
5 
As a result of these features, we might regard the ICN as 
belonging at the highly informal end of the spectrum of formality of TRNs in every dimension 
identified in the framing chapter of this volume. It bears noting at this point that the mere fact that the 
ICN is informal and unambitious does not insulate it from evaluation of either its efficacy or 
accountability. This is particularly so given that the ICN does have some normative ambitions to guide 
and influence the conduct of its members. Specifically, the ICN aims to ‘formulate proposals for 
procedural and substantive convergence through a results-oriented agenda and structure’ and to 
‘encourage the dissemination of antitrust experience and best practices, promote the advocacy role of 
antitrust agencies and seek to facilitate international cooperation’.6  However, the adoption of the 
norms elaborated in the ICN context is not assured via legal means, instead, ‘where ICN reaches 
consensus on recommendations … it will be left to the individual antitrust agencies to decide whether 
and how to implement’ them. In other words, the compliance with the norms elaborated within the 
ICN could be assured by virtue of their persuasiveness to the membership and without (ICN) legal 
means.  
In seeking to provide a framework for evaluation of such a highly informal network, this contribution 
proceeds in a few distinct steps. First, we begin with the question whether, as had been argued by 
Slaughter, we are likely to observe the emergence of the informal tools of maintaining cooperation and 
norm-compliance in the context of the ICN. Secondly, for a network such as the ICN a focus merely 
on the emergence of alternative norm-enforcement mechanisms may be too limited. This is because 
the ICN was not formed with a background set of commonly agreed-to competition rules or norms, 
and instead has an explicit learning and exchange objective, with one, if not the key aim being to 
enhance implementation knowledge and capacity of the agencies and officials of emerging antitrust 
                                                     
3
 The Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the ICN (ICN Establishment Memorandum) provides no 
restriction on membership, other than the requirement that ‘[m]embers are national or multinational competition agencies 
entrusted with the enforcement of antitrust laws’ 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc579.pdf > accessed 10 November 2011. 
4
 The ICN Establishment Memorandum describes the ICN as ‘project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of 
antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries that will address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of 
common interest’. (n 3). 
5
 The ICN Establishment Memorandum explicitly provides that the ICN will not ‘exercise any rule-making function’ (n 3). 
6
 (n 3). 
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jurisdictions. To fulfil this objective, within the ICN we have observed the formalisation of certain 
tools of learning or knowledge transfer. While I argue that this is preferable to relying merely on 
unstructured learning and exchange, the chapter ends with some words of caution about how the 
architecture of knowledge and norm-building is formalised in the ICN, which are likely to apply to 
other TRN settings as well.  
Informality: Advantage or Challenge for the Networked Orders 
In her analysis of the potential of TRNs as a tool for international cooperation and as a basis of a new 
world order, Slaughter did not treat their informality as an obstacle. Quite to the contrary, the less 
formal character of such networks offered a decided advantage compared to the negotiation of treaties 
and establishment of international bureaucracies to enforce the treaty rules, which is regarded as the 
gold standard of the enforcement of international law especially in the post-World War II period. This 
view is understandable given the usual experience of the glacial pace of treaty negotiation by 
diplomatic representatives, who tend to view every negotiating point through the prism of State 
interest trade-offs. Such an approach to negotiation has often meant that by the time a treaty with an 
acceptable set of norms could be agreed upon, the regulatory problems faced by the world may well 
have changed, leaving the regime largely dormant with any resulting international organisation being 
perceived as ineffectual. The international organisation could also be ineffectual if staffed by national 
diplomats who view every issue as an occasion to assert or trade-off national interests, rather than 
through the prism of resolving concrete regulatory problems. 
The informality of networks as a cooperation tool, by contrast, provides the associated advantage of 
flexibility together with a degree of self-sufficiency. They could be formed in response to specific 
regulatory problems, by officials who have to deal with such problems on a day-to-day basis and 
without pre-existing agreement as to rules or rule-enforcement. To the extent that officials are 
technocrats or professionals, they might share a similar perspective and language that would make 
interaction and agreement easier to achieve
7
. Moreover, such interactions and the scope for 
cooperation would be enhanced by their focus on solving problems (win-win) rather than defending 
national interests (zero-sum). 
Flexibility has an added advantage in the regulatory context if the problems faced by regulators are 
likely to change rapidly and unpredictably. In the antitrust setting, changing competitive strategies by 
firms or shifts in technology that alter market boundaries and bases of competition can easily 
undermine competition enforcement efforts. A less formal cooperation infrastructure is going to be 
less rigid and the focus, priorities, and rules would be easier to change in response to new problems or 
changed priorities.
8
 This reflects the fact that the more dynamic the world is that is the subject of 
regulation, the less likely is a regime of narrow rules, which are difficult to change or augment, to 
provide an effective response.  
                                                     
7
 In the EU context see Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of 
European Law 3, 55-56, also Hans-W. Micklitz and Dennis Patterson, ‘From the Nation State to the Market:  The 
Evolution of EU Private Law’ (unpublished manuscript, 2012).  
8
 Thus, in the context of the European Competition Network (ECN), it has been observed that working groups can be formed 
as specific issues arise and dissolved when their purpose is fulfilled, which in turn suggests that a ‘description of the ECN 
as it stands today, may … be obsolete in a few months time’. Kris Dekeyser and Dorothe Dalheimer, ‘Cooperation within 
the European Competition Network - Taking Stock after Ten Months of Case Practice’ in Philip Lowe and Michael 
Reyonlds (eds), Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice (International Bar Association, London 2005) 121. 
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Maintaining Cooperation through Informal Means 
While its constitutive documents describe the ICN precisely as a ‘project-driven’ and ‘results-
oriented’, as already pointed out they do not envisage any binding instruments through which to 
guarantee the cooperation of member authorities to either participate in joint projects, to stick to 
commitments made for the solving of specific problems or more broadly to adhere to emergent norms 
of best practices developed within the network. Yet Slaughter has argued that the absence of formal 
enforcement mechanisms as part of the TRN architecture, such as dispute resolution bodies that could 
identify and sanction non-compliance, does not necessarily mean that TRNs would not be effective 
vehicles for ensuring compliance with international norms. In particular, she pointed to a number of 
alternative mechanisms for the enforcement of norms and cooperation identified in the literature that 
do not rely on special bodies for dispute resolution and sanction and that may be transposed to the 
quasi-professional and self-sufficient group contexts of TRNs.
9 
For example, in their work, scholars 
such as Robert Elickson
10
 and Lisa Bernstein
11
 have identified mechanisms through which neighbours 
or groups of traders in an industry maintain cooperation and order without necessarily relying on 
formal mechanisms such as legal rules or courts. According to Slaughter, TRNs can rely on similar 
non-legal mechanisms such as withdrawal of cooperation, building of reputation, or socialisation to 
ensure cooperation and compliance with emergent norms informally.
12
  
In evaluating the potential for informal mechanisms of cooperation within TRNs, it might be useful to 
begin with Jon Elster’s systematisation of such mechanisms. Legal norms are distinguished by Elster 
by the fact that they ‘depend on specialised enforcers’ who are charged with verifying norm 
compliance.
13
 Setting apart legal mechanisms, he distinguishes three modalities of self-enforcement 
within a group that could be applicable to ensure cooperation in the TRN context:  
1. Cooperation could be maintained as between parties because the parties’ incentives favour 
continued cooperation (such as for example the notion of a repeated game equilibrium)
14
 
2. Cooperation could be maintained due to the existence of social norms that parties are unwilling to 
violate because of the condemnation of such violation by other members of the group 
3. Parties could maintain cooperative behaviour and follow norms for intrinsic reasons related to the 
parties’ own preferences (Elster refers to this mechanism as the following of a ‘moral’ norm15). 
As we will see, in the context of the ICN (and likely also in the context of many if not most other 
TRNs), there are problems associated with the observability and characterisation of the conduct of 
national regulatory officials (or other relevant decision-makers) that present serious difficulties for the 
likely efficacy of all of the above informal modalities of maintaining cooperation. 
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Incentive Based Cooperation 
A substantial literature, stemming in particular from the theory of incomplete contracts and industrial 
organisation, identifies circumstances under which agreements between parties can be self-enforcing, 
even in the absence of formal (external) means of resolving disputes and sanctioning non-
compliance.
16 
The mechanism of informal enforcement identified in this literature is based on the 
parties’ incentives in favour of continued cooperation stemming from the prospect of future dealings 
between them. A party will maintain cooperation and comply with common norms even in the absence 
of any formal enforcement mechanism because another party to the agreement can punish non-
compliance by withdrawing future cooperation. As long as all parties in the group care sufficiently 
about the gains from cooperation in the future, the threatened punishment (if credible) will temper any 
short-term temptations to ‘cheat’ on their agreement by acting inconsistently with common norms.  
As Gilson, Sabel and Scott point out further, in settings where there are multiple other entities whom 
each of the parties can deal with, the retaliatory punishment for non-compliance can also be effected 
through the party cheating on the norms developing a reputation for misbehaving. A bad reputation for 
cooperation will lead other potential counterparties to avoid dealing with the misbehaving party in the 
future as well, thus enhancing the incentive in favour of continued cooperation.
17 
 
Yet the operation of mechanisms for sustaining cooperation through the prospect of future dealings is 
substantially attenuated in the context of a regulatory network such as the ICN for a number of 
reasons. First, even with respect to the initial trigger for retaliation, in light of the fact that ICN norms 
are expressly identified as non-binding, it is not clear that failure to observe certain of the norms 
developed within the network would either be qualified as cheating or that it would lead to the creation 
of a bad reputation and the withdrawal of cooperation from other participants.
18
 In fact, in a number of 
interviews, discussed in more detail below, national officials indicated that after failing to persuade the 
ICN membership of the wisdom of their own domestic rules when formulating a common norm, 
within their own jurisdiction they continue to follow the domestic norm as more appropriate to 
domestic circumstances.
19
 
Finally, it is not clear how in the ICN setting a withdrawal of future cooperation would be effectuated 
even if a failure to cooperate and/or observe an ICN norm is identified as cheating behaviour. In other 
words, it is not clear how in this context ‘one member would “switch its business” to a member with a 
better reputation’20. The ICN aims to be broad-based, it does not have provisions identifying criteria 
for admission into membership,
21
 nor does it provide for the exclusion from membership of a 
particular agency. Nor does the ICN have mechanisms for deeper engagement among some of its 
members that could induce members to cultivate a good reputation. Finally, the threat of withdrawal of 
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cooperation might not be credible and, as Slaughter recognises,
22
 may in any event be counter-
productive since authorities that are perceived to be failing their obligations would be those most in 
need of continued engagement in the network. 
Social and Intrinsic Reasons for Maintaining Cooperation 
It may be argued that the incentive-based mechanisms for self-enforcement are more likely to sustain 
cooperation between profit-driven parties in commercial settings. By contrast, it would be more 
difficult to identify precisely the incentives for cooperation and the punishment strategies in a broad 
network of regulators such as the ICN. However, as we saw, there are other mechanisms for 
maintaining cooperative behaviour in groups, in the absence of formal compliance, that do not rely on 
the calculation of prospective gains from cooperation to each individual party as inducement. Such 
mechanisms are said to be ‘normative’ or ‘dispositional’.23 They are based on morality, or tastes for 
compliance or reciprocity by each individual party, or on the party’s desire to avoid the opprobrium of 
its social group, even in situations where there may be a net gain from deviating from the 
arrangement.
24
 In Slaughter’s taxonomy, this might correspond to enforcement through 
‘socialization’.25 An individual member will continue to behave in a cooperative way and not 
contravene established group norms either out of fear of social condemnation by group members (what 
Elster calls ‘social norm’ enforcement through the sanction other group members impose when 
observing norm violators
26
) or because the norms become so ingrained that they have become 
constitutive of the group members’ identity (what Elster refers to as ‘moral norms’, which an agent 
would follow even in the absence of observation or sanction by group members).  
Again, if we consider the make-up and modalities of interaction of a TRN such as the ICN, we might 
be somewhat sceptical about the likelihood that these alternative forms of norm enforcement would be 
likely to emerge and ensure continued cooperation at the supranational level. 
Cooperation through social norm enforcement is maintained by the opprobrium of violators by group 
members. Such bonds are most likely to exist in smaller close-knit and fairly homogeneous 
communities,
27 
where individual members know each other intimately, can observe each other’s 
conduct and can apply social pressure to other members for observed divergences from common and 
easily indentified norms. 
In the context of the ICN there are some reasons to be cautious about purely informal socialisation as a 
sufficient channel for cooperation and compliance with international competition norms. First, the ICN 
is a large non-selective network encompassing all competition agencies around the world. While it is 
true that the member authorities have opportunities for frequent and repeated face-to-face interaction 
through both ICN and other competition forums and bodies, it is also true that the network members 
are authorities, while the participants in individual meetings are officials.
28 
The work of Bernstein
29
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and Ellickson (just like the experimental literature on preferences of reciprocity) describes individuals 
as holders of reciprocity preferences or objects of socialisation, and applying similar analysis to 
collective bodies and organisations is more problematic. Even if the membership of the authority was 
assumed to be stable, it is likely that some officials may be more likely to attend ICN meetings 
compared to others so as to become socialised in the group, and some officials may have preferences 
for reciprocal behaviour and not others. More fundamentally, the make-up of agencies changes over 
time and therefore, any purely informal mechanism relying on socialisation or preferences for 
reciprocity would not be robust.  
A further and even more serious problem is presented by the observability of agency actions (and 
more specifically any deviations from the norms), their attribution and characterisation in the context 
of a large regulatory network such as the ICN. Similar to the incentive-based mechanism, informal 
enforcement of social norms relies on the ability of parties to observe the conduct of members, to 
properly characterise it as a deviation, so that they can either punish or ostracise the misbehaving 
party. The size of the network (in terms of the number of authorities involved) and the fact that each 
authority is composed of a relatively large number of individual officials, each of whom may take on a 
daily basis numerous fact-intensive and context-specific competition decisions makes it exceedingly 
difficult for others in the network to observe such actions, properly characterise them as either deviant 
or compliant, and attribute them to the authority. (For example, is conduct that apparently deviates 
from an established norm a one-off error by an official, or does it constitute evidence of non-
compliance by the authority?). 
Moreover, the competition authorities that form part of the ICN are not the only relevant national 
actors when it comes to antitrust policy and decision-making at the national level. The local antitrust 
rules of any particular jurisdiction are generally determined by legislators, while the general direction 
of competition policy might be influenced by government ministers or other political officials. In other 
words, the supranational regulatory network is not entirely self-sufficient within its domain
30
.  In many 
jurisdictions, the first level decision-maker may be a court, while in others courts would still play a 
crucial role as part of the processes of judicial review or appeal. Actors such as legislators, ministers, 
or generalist judges do not, as a matter of course, participate in the deliberation of the ICN.
31 
Therefore, the fact that competition officials might be subject to the social opprobrium of their peers in 
the ICN for their jurisdiction’s violation of the common norms would not be relevant in ensuring a 
general level of norm compliance. 
The nature of the norms and the compliance context also impact the ease of observing and 
characterising the actions of network members. A social norm such as an injunction that black clothes 
should be worn at a funeral
32
 is easy to enforce by groups because attendees at a funeral can easily 
observe each other and the colour of each other’s clothes. While some issues of interpretation and 
characterisation in such a setting may arise, they are not likely to be significant. Within the Basel club 
of banking regulators a fairly simple bright-line rule, such as the capital adequacy requirement, was 
apparently widely adopted and followed even in the absence of any formal enforcement mechanisms:
33 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Compliance with that type of a rule might be relatively easier to observe,
34
 even if we abstract from 
recent debates about precisely what counts as holdings of adequate liquid capital.  
This is not the case with many of the antitrust norms generated through the ICN. Even if the 
participant authorities were to agree on a common approach for analysing the competitive effect of 
mergers or exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, non-compliance with the common norm would be 
difficult to observe given both the possibility for divergent interpretations as well as the very fact-
intensive nature of antitrust decision-making. In other words, understanding whether an authority does 
indeed comply with commonly adopted norms requires a fairly intense engagement and appreciation 
of the market dynamics underlying each decision, which would not be an easy task even for a body, 
such as a court, exclusively dedicated to the question of compliance. 
Moreover, if the current antitrust rules of various jurisdictions or recommended practices elaborated 
within the ICN are a guide, the typical network norms or best practices are not simple bright-line rules. 
Rather they are more likely to be expressed as broader standards leaving substantial residual discretion 
to authorities in applying them to specific local circumstances. This means that even if the numerous 
actions and decisions of individual officials are observable within the network, the signal sent by each 
decision is likely to be quite noisy so that it may often not be easy to characterise it as compliant or not 
through mere observation from a distance and without a deeper engagement in the enforcement effort 
and its results. 
Problems of characterisation of conduct as compliant or otherwise can arise even with respect to fairly 
simple rules, if there exist possible attenuating circumstances that justify an apparent deviation. To 
return to the example of the simple norm, it may be justified by the social group for a member to wear 
navy clothes at a funeral, if they do not own black clothes, if they cannot afford to buy new ones just 
for the funeral, or if due to some other exigency it was impossible to procure black clothes in time. 
Similarly, it may also be justified by the ICN membership for an authority not to take action against a 
specific merger if it has no power to enforce its decision against the firms involved or to adopt certain 
emergency measures in times of economic or other crisis.  
As Gilson, Sabel, and Scott observe, in a ‘noisy’ environment, where there are numerous potentially 
confounding (and excusing) factors making it difficult to characterise conduct as cooperative or 
deviant, the dominant strategy for individual parties is ‘more forgiving’.35 In other words, they would 
tend not to punish every time there is a suspicion of non-compliance. But this presents a problem 
where the participants in the network are numerous and are not pre-screened for their predisposition to 
reciprocate, and where any common norms are neither simple nor pre-existing, but are being 
developed over time within the network. These problems of observability and characterisation of 
conduct will undermine any mechanism of informal enforcement that relies on group observation and 
sanctioning of conduct, either through the withdrawal of continued cooperation or through social 
opprobrium, in the absence of some mechanisms of formal reporting and comparison of 
implementation efforts and results that would enable network members to understand what precisely 
the others are doing.  
In Elster’s classification of the non-legal modalities of maintaining cooperation, there is only one that 
does not depend on the ability to observe and characterise the actions of others in the group, namely 
the enforcement of moral norms. An agent observes a moral norm where they follow the norm 
irrespective of their incentives and irrespective of whether they are observed or observe anyone else in 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Law 547, 595. By contrast the more flexible rules of Basel II might make defections harder to detect. Verdier (n 18) 137, 
142. 
34
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the group complying with the norm. In other words, they have developed a preference for following 
the norm.  
There are various reasons for scepticism that such an enforcement mechanism would be relevant in the 
ICN context. Perhaps the most important one is the fact that the ICN was not formed with the view of 
enforcing a pre-existing set of norms. Instead, the norms were to be developed through discussion and 
interaction within the ICN. Moreover, many of the authorities lacked the analytic capacity to enforce 
competition norms and therefore part of the objective of the ICN is to build up enforcement capacity 
within its membership.  
The enforcement of moral norms, according to Elster’s taxonomy, is true self-enforcement because it 
relies in self-policing. But it requires that each individual agent knows the norm, knows how to apply 
the norm in a particular situation and is capable of characterising her own behaviour as compliant or 
non-compliant with the norm. Thus, to take Elster’s examples of relatively simple injunctions, such as 
not littering in a park or wearing black clothes to a funeral, whatever the origin of the norms, one can 
envisage that after a period of following the injunction and observing others following it, the norm 
may become intrinsic to the agent. If there exists some room for self-doubt in any of these steps, the 
individual member may need some process through which to learn precisely what the norm requires, 
how it might be applied in specific circumstances and what might constitute compliance or deviation; 
this is if the norm is in fact constitutive of their identity rather than merely a post hoc rationalising 
incantation. That process would require observation of and comparison with the conduct of others in 
applying the norms in similar circumstances. 
36 
Where, such as in the ICN, the group does not begin 
with a set of norms, such processes would also be necessary for the norms to crystallise in the first 
place. 
Again it bears reiterating at this point that if there is a clear distinction between members of an agency 
who participate in international ICN deliberations and those who do not, yet who have daily decision-
making responsibilities, this process of internalisation of norms is made all the more difficult. Further, 
if the network is to rely on officials becoming socialised into the ‘competition community’ so that they 
develop a preference for following common norms, and if the common norms change from time to 
time for any reason, some mechanism would need to exist for dropping the old and learning the new 
practice. 
Enforcement Subsets? 
Slaughter recognises that informal processes of maintaining cooperation are likely to be the strongest 
in organisations with ‘small and selective’ membership, such as the Basel Committee, given that it is 
made up of representatives of the central banks of a small number of industrialised countries.
37 
Along 
those lines, the ICN does envisage that the enforcement of the established norms could take place in 
smaller groups or subsets of nations.
38
 However, the selectiveness and stability in the membership of 
such bodies means that it will be more difficult to disrupt a consensus which is sub-optimal or to 
adjust the consensus to a changing underlying environment. If there is no follow-up on actual 
implementation and a way to identify new problems and threats, this limits the learning capacity of 
such groups. Thus, while a club-like environment makes it more likely to be flexible or permissive 
towards alternative approaches followed by individual members, the absence of follow-up on 
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implementation may limit the ability of the group to learn from any residual diversity among the 
membership.
39 
The Generation of Norms in a Regulatory Network 
The prior section proceeded on the premise that the ICN has normative ambitions. In other words, it 
generates normative output (such as recommended practices) that, it is hoped, will affect the actions of 
the member authorities even in the absence of formal enforcement tools.
40
 Therefore, the first question 
we asked is whether the informal bonds that can support cooperation in groups are likely to emerge to 
give bite to the normative output of the ICN and this appears to be unlikely within the ICN’s current 
architecture. Given that the norms are neither simple nor pre-existing, and given that the ICN does not 
have mechanisms through which to make the conduct of member agencies observable to each other in 
a systematic way, the ICN architecture itself is not likely to provide a substantial constraint on the 
action of member agencies, let alone their respective States.  
This might, in turn, lead us to the question of why choose an informal network forum in this context in 
the first place? 
In answering this question, it is worth recalling that problems associated with observing and 
characterising conduct (both by the parties and by an adjudicator) also present the principal difficulties 
for legal enforcement in many different contexts
41
. In fact, we may argue that one of the principal 
reasons for the repeated failures in the negotiation of a binding antitrust instrument at the international 
level is the fact that the decision-making of competition regulators and courts is extremely fact-
intensive and context-dependent, with most national regimes – at some point in the decision-making 
process – allowing for broader consideration and balancing of relevant factors.  
The competitive significance of a restraint on conduct or merger would depend not only on the current 
structure and players of the domestic market, but on a myriad of other considerations, including the 
openness of the domestic economy to foreign entry, the existence of formal government restrictions on 
market entry, as well as informal political/economic interests that effectively foreclose entry in some 
domestic markets. It is precisely in the context of such thick consideration of facts and local conditions 
that verifying compliance with norms presents a challenge for an independent decision-making 
tribunal, such as a court, even where there exists some corpus of commonly-agreed upon norms.  
The reality of the very fact-based nature of antitrust decision-making would therefore be a significant 
impediment to both the creation and the verification of compliance with a formal instrument of 
binding norms. Moreover, as is often the case with the informal transnational networks, at the time of 
the creation of the ICN there were few commonly-agreed to antitrust norms or principles at the global 
level. This fact is not surprising given the failure of the push by the EU to include even minimal 
antitrust approximation within the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. The EU’s proposal envisaged 
only one harmonised substantive norm, namely a rule against horizontal cartels, which was thought to 
command a fairly broad consensus. Even this minimal harmonisation proposal was seen as 
                                                     
39
 For instance, Zaring notes that the Basle standards were acclaimed for their real impact and for the strengthening in risk 
management which was said to be responsible for the absence of significant difficulties in US or European banking 
systems. (n 33) 560. Even accepting that as true, the Basel Committee standards did not avert the more recent major crisis 
in the banking sector. As Christensen would argue, expertise with the current technology makes the incumbent blind to 
disruptive threats, particularly if the incumbent closes the door to information about such threats. We can pinpoint these 
characteristics of the club environment in Verdier’s retelling of the Basel case study, including an over-confidence that 
the ‘club rules’ are optimal, permissiveness to deviations by club members, and yet a resistance to learn from divergent 
approaches (such as those of Germany and Japan). Verdier (n 18) 135-140.  
40
 In other words, while not formal law, the ICN output does seek to constrain the freedom of members to act on the basis of 
purely unilateral considerations. 
41
 Eg Robert Scott and George Triantis, ‘Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 814. 
Dimensions of Self-Sufficiency 
15 
unacceptable for representatives of developing nations, who feared being boxed into an enforcement 
regime that did not reflect their local developmental priorities.
42
 For instance, developing nations’ 
concerns would have focused on the fact that certain policy tools such as industrial or production 
clusters (seen to have been the key in the development process of some industrialised nations) or 
export associations (to provide a counterweight to the market power of a foreign buyer) would be 
foreclosed by such a rule. Moreover, an international rule against cartels would force domestic 
agencies to prioritise such enforcement even if they perceive a greater threat from the monopoly or 
monopsony power of large multinationals, against which they would have little or no recourse. 
Additionally, jurisdictions which are newer to the antitrust game would also be reluctant to assume 
binding obligations because of the lack of resources and capacity of their implementation regimes. In 
other words, such jurisdictions might be found to have failed in their international obligations where 
enforcement agencies simply did not have adequate resources to devote to certain problems, or where 
due to lack of resources combined with inexperience they reached decisions later found to be 
inconsistent with international norms. As a result, at its inception the ICN was starting largely from a 
blank slate at least in terms of agreed upon substantive or procedural norms.
43 
 
The question of the informalism of networks tends usually to be viewed through the prism of 
enforcement as the usual task of international bodies under traditional conceptions of international 
law. In the traditional international law framework, States’ representatives first negotiate the common 
legal rules or norms, and then seek to empower a particular organisation or dispute-resolution body 
with the task of enforcement. By contrast, TRNs and other informal law-making fora are commonly 
formed when there does not even exist an agreed upon set of norms. Therefore, in evaluating the 
efficacy and accountability of these newer instruments of international cooperation it is not sufficient 
to focus on a single dimension, such as the capacity to enforce norms. Instead, we must assess the role 
and adequacy of informal mechanisms for the emergence of common norms and the understanding of 
such norms among the membership, but also for building up the members’ capacity to implement 
them. In TRNs the processes of norm-creation, mutual learning, capacity building, and implementation 
tend to take place simultaneously. How those processes are structured, or formalised, may have 
important consequences on the efficacy and legitimacy of TRNs as tools of international cooperation 
quite apart from the question of enforcement.  
Formalisation and Learning 
In light of the foregoing, one response to the claim made at the outset that the tools of self-
enforcement are unlikely to develop to maintain cooperative behaviour within the ICN might be that 
the ICN does not aim to be an enforcement network. Instead, given the limited goals established from 
the very outset, the ICN could be classified as an ‘information network’, to use Slaughter’s44 
taxonomy, which is focused on exchange of information and learning. For instance, the Establishment 
Memorandum refers to the ICN missions of ‘encourag[ing] the dissemination of antitrust experience,’ 
building on existing contacts among agencies and ‘provid[ing] the opportunity for its members to 
maintain regular contacts’ through meetings and conferences. Similarly, much of the enthusiasm that 
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has been expressed about the ICN has focused precisely on its function as a vehicle to ‘facilitate the 
sharing of information and experience, facilitate cooperation, and work towards consensus rules, 
principles, methodologies, and procedures’.45 
Yet the mere classification as an information network does not insulate an it from evaluation of 
efficacy or accountability. Instead, this simply raises the further question of how we can make efficacy 
and accountability assessments where the emphasis of a TRN is on learning. It seems that the question 
about the quality of learning that takes place in such a network cannot be answered without focusing 
on what member agencies do in their domestic implementation and the extent to which this reflects the 
norms and practices learned from their network peers. Given that the processes of norm creation, 
learning, and implementation are not staggered, but take place simultaneously in a dynamic 
environment, questions of learning and implementation are inextricably linked. 
From the very outset then we face the problem that, while discussions among officials may be useful 
to share experiences and test more abstract ideas, it is exceedingly difficult to assess the efficacy of 
such a forum, the quality of the learning that takes place and ultimately the usefulness of the network 
without some mechanisms that track the impact on relevant domestic or international outcomes, which 
should be built into the architecture of the network. Discussions after all do not resolve specific cases 
and disciplined learning is not merely anecdotal, but it requires some formulation of knowledge either 
from first principles or through the formalisation of practice. It is not surprising then that even for a 
network that did not aim to develop an antitrust code, the ICN from its very first meeting onwards 
proceeded towards the development of recommended practices (in the format of rules) for member 
authorities to follow in their decision-making.  
Learning across agencies cannot take place absent some formalisation of knowledge where there is a 
diversity of implementation strategies available and where there is some uncertainty as to whether one 
or other would lead to successful implementation. We might rightly be sceptical about the kind of 
transfer that takes place where inter-agency ‘contacts’46 lead to nothing other than unstructured ‘two-
by-two’ learning.47 For instance, the mere fact that the EU provides funding by way of technical 
assistance for the establishment of a competition regime does not necessarily mean that the EU legal 
provisions or enforcement model provide a good template for the recipient nation. In fact, the 
thoughtful adoption of an example from another jurisdiction will almost certainly involve an 
adaptation to the local circumstances,
48
 which adaptation itself might be useful for some other 
jurisdiction. 
Interviews with officials from different jurisdictions revealed a number of problems associated with 
unstructured (or two-by-two) agency contacts in the process of learning and exchange. For example, a 
Barbados official described an informal consultation relationship developed with the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), noting that he and his colleagues, when dealing with a specific case, would ask 
whether FTC officials ‘have come across this type of activity before in this sort of industry’ and ‘what 
their experiences have shown them’ in such cases.49 But for such a relationship to work, the requesting 
authority needs to be able to forward the questions to a specific person at the other authority, who has 
both the time and the relevant knowledge to share with the requesting authority, which may often not 
be the case.  
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Authorities sometimes try to deal with this problem by formalising their interactions rather than 
relying on ad hoc contacts and requests. Thus, the Barbados official described that in their interactions 
with the FTC, a ‘resource person’ was identified as a ‘sounding board in terms of ideas and 
discussions when [Barbados officials] have issues that [they] find unique and unusual’50. However, 
given similar concerns about time and commitment, the Barbados official noted that they had moved 
away from ‘ad hoc calls’ towards ‘scheduled calls on a quarterly basis’, which are preceded by the 
Barbados officials sending in advance selected reading materials about current cases for consideration 
by the designated FTC contacts.
51
 
Note however that giving structure to the two-by-two relationship in this way does not guarantee that 
the other authority will have relevant knowledge to share. The Barbados official, for instance, 
emphasised that in their discussions with the FTC both sides recognised that the setting in which the 
Barbados authority operates, including the structure and size of the economy, is drastically different 
from that of the US. Thus, while the Barbados enforcers sought to understand the FTC’s experiences, 
they would often recognise that their own local ‘circumstances were different’,52 which in this bilateral 
dialogue is essentially the end of the conversation and the learning process. 
The borrowing of an implementation practice, if it occurs in such a bilateral dialogue, can either be 
entirely appropriate, or it can lead to the borrowing of a practice that is not effective at all, or one that 
is not likely to be effective in the recipient’s domestic context, or one that reflects policy preferences 
and needs in the first jurisdiction, but not in the recipient one. Without exposing this exchange to 
scrutiny from the point of view of implementation outcomes in both the advanced and the recipient 
jurisdiction, it is difficult to assess either its efficacy or accountability. 
By multiplying the sources of examples, the network structure improves the ability of participants to 
learn from appropriate or relevant sources, but whether such potential is realised depends on the 
architecture of the network and how the interactions between authorities are structured, in other words, 
on how knowledge is formalised and transferred. Taking the knowledge transfer out of two-by-two 
conversations does also improve the accountability and transparency of transnational agency 
interactions, often a point of criticism of TRNs, but not at the expense of the efficacy of learning. 
The promulgation of recommended enforcement rules and practices in the ICN setting is one example 
of formalisation of knowledge.
53
 One advantage of such a tool is that selection of best practices as a 
regulatory method can work ‘through horizontal modeling rather than hierarchical direction’, allowing 
for a degree of ‘localism or subsidiarity’ by contrast to the standard harmonisation approach.54 In 
addition, the formalisation of best practice selection suggests a more disciplined approach to the 
dissemination of information to member authorities, taking the ICN beyond a mere talking forum in 
which antitrust officials are to learn either through conversation, osmosis, or acculturation to widely 
accepted, though untested, verities such as a belief in the efficiency of business conduct or a mistrust 
of bigness as a badge of market dominance. Making tacit knowledge explicit makes it both easier for 
newcomers to learn it, but also subject to scrutiny from outside the network. 
                                                     
50
 (n 49). 
51
 (n 49). 
52
 (n 49). 
53
 In a description of the ICN’s methods Monti explains that the typical approach is ‘to identify issues for coordination, for 
which [the ICN] establishes a working group’, which group then ‘carries out various surveys and consultations’ and then 
‘releases documents outlining “recommended practices” in the given field, as well as “workbooks” or “handbooks” 
explaining how certain kinds of antitrust analysis ought to be carried out’. Giorgio Monti, ‘Unilateral Conduct: The 
Search for Global Standards’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), International Research Handbook on Competition Law (Edward 
Elgar, forthcoming 2012). 
54
 David Zaring, ‘Best Practices’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 294, 297. 
Yane Svetiev 
18 
The compilations of recommended practices do look like a set of antitrust model rules, despite the fact 
that the ICN explicitly disclaims a mandate to develop an antitrust code. Such recommended practices 
are formalised through deliberation and, at least notionally, require consensus from the membership 
even if compliance with them is not in any way binding. 
While consensus is required for the adoption of suggested practices in the ICN, it does not have the 
quality of hard consensus of the kind required (at least ideally) in treaty negotiations. Recognising the 
non-binding nature of the ICN best practices, representatives of national agencies will not block 
consensus even where they hold the view that the adopted recommendation is not appropriate to 
specific circumstances and market conditions in their own jurisdiction and that they are not likely to 
follow it in the future.
55
 To the extent that these authorities have correctly assessed their domestic 
circumstances and needs, precisely the non-implementation of the ICN recommendation is consistent 
with the goals of efficacy and accountability. 
Such divergence in national practice can be a potential source of improvement in the norms of the 
TRN as well. Hard harmonisation of simple rules cannot be an object in itself where there is a wide 
divergence in implementation contexts and local policy objectives and the weighting of those 
objectives. It may well be that in particular implementation circumstances it makes sense to follow a 
different enforcement practice and this could be revealed in follow-up of the use of the recommended 
versus the diverging rule. Thus, for example the rationales offered by authorities for their divergence 
from ICN recommendations are testable and, moreover, they are potentially applicable in other 
countries. However, the interviewed officials regarded the adoption of a best practice as the closing of 
the ICN conversation, rather than the opening of further deliberation. Namely, they referred to 
arguments they made for the adoption of rules different from the ones that had been proposed for 
adoption by ICN working groups. While noting that their arguments did not prevail and they 
ultimately lost the battle in the ICN, both indicated that their own jurisdictions/agencies nonetheless 
continued to follow the earlier approach in domestic cases.
56
 The resulting closure of deliberation, 
perhaps due to the focus on achieving consensus and going forward, might be a particularly 
undesirable aspect of the ‘let go if you lose the battle’ social norm in network deliberations,57 which 
should be corrected for in the formal network infrastructure.
58
 
The foregoing example illustrates a paradox. Namely, the absence of notionally hard and enforceable 
legal rules does create incentives for participants in TRNs to engage in freer information exchange 
with their peers. Otherwise, it is likely that both consensus on norms would be very difficult to reach 
and participants would not be so free to elaborate on the conditions that lead them to diverge from 
proposed norms. But even if, as the current chair of its Steering Committee has claimed, one aim of 
the ICN is to benefit from ‘informed divergence’ among network members,59 the network would need 
to formalise mechanisms that enable observability and characterisation of conduct, even if just for the 
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purposes of learning. Namely, the network requires mechanisms through which the membership could 
observe the conduct of agencies and characterise it vis-à-vis emergent common norms, exploring the 
reasons for any divergence and the outcomes from the implementation of the divergent practice in 
their local contexts. Moreover, observability and characterisation of conduct also aid in the 
accountability of ICN members both towards their international peers and towards their domestic 
constituencies; this is because they can demonstrate both what they learn from and what they 
contribute to the transnational network. 
This discussion has, apparently, brought us to a full circle. If we were to look at the networks as 
vehicles for the enforcement of norms, the key limitation is the absence of mechanisms for making 
conduct observable and characterising the extent to which it complies with common norms. Networks 
as fora for learning from peers require the formalisation of mechanisms that serve precisely those very 
same functions. 
Agenda Setting and Decentralised Learning 
Before concluding, it is worth pointing out another aspect of the norm-generation and learning process 
in the ICN. As already pointed out, within the ICN there has been an effort towards collective 
formalisation of knowledge and learning that goes beyond unstructured discussion or two-by-two 
learning. However, to understand the limitations to the potential for decentralised learning, we also 
have to focus on the architecture of the initiation and conduct of such exercises. 
In particular, in an environment where the network does not have a formal secretariat and governing 
body, the day-to-day organisation tasks often go to the authorities of the established jurisdictions from 
industrialised countries.
60
 This has certainly been the case throughout the brief history of the ICN and 
in principle there is nothing sinister about that fact. Officials from these larger and better-funded 
authorities may well view this as a form of public service to the international community and an 
alternative to more standard forms of development assistance.  
However, reliance on advanced authorities in this way also has substantive consequences in terms of 
the kind of learning that takes place within the network. For instance, topic areas for discussion or for 
the elaboration of recommended practices may reflect areas in which there is a consensus between 
established antitrust jurisdictions (such as procedures of merger review or rules on cartels). This in 
turn may discourage precisely the kind of experimentation that would reveal improvements on the 
current consensus or that would reveal alternative rules and methodologies appropriate for 
jurisdictions with differential market and developmental conditions. This is particularly so when we 
consider that antitrust is a policy area that is not entirely contained and self-sufficient, in the sense that 
it easily impinges upon other policy areas with developmental, industrial, redistributive, and even 
environmental goals.  
In addition, even where agenda-setters aim to choose topics on which there is no current consensus as 
between established jurisdictions, they may choose issues that have low enforcement salience in many 
of the newer antitrust jurisdictions. As one example, consider the 2009 annual ICN meeting in which 
one principal topic of discussion for the plenary sessions was the antitrust treatment of bundled and 
loyalty discounts. This may be regarded as an issue on the cutting edge of antitrust law and economics, 
and on which the principal jurisdictions (the US and the EU) have diverged in their approach. 
Arguably, however, in many of the emerging antitrust jurisdictions this is an issue of quite low 
enforcement salience, which means that both the relevance of the learning exercise and their ability to 
contribute to such an exercise or learn from it is limited.  
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One representative of an NGO that has been operating to promote competition and consumer 
protection regulation in the developing world referred to these aspects of the agenda-setting process 
and the framing of discussions within the ICN as an ‘abuse of dominance’ by the agencies of the 
western industrialised nations.
61
 It is certainly the case that this type of agenda-setting promotes a 
more passive participation for representatives of newer jurisdictions in the deliberations of the 
network. Given that authorities of the newer jurisdictions are not likely any time soon to be able to 
replicate the resources, enforcement staff, and antitrust professionals (lawyers and economists) of the 
western agencies, the principal objective should be not just to educate these officials on the analytic 
intricacies of advanced and contested antitrust problems. The objective instead should be to uncover 
and disseminate knowledge about ‘disruptive’62 enforcement strategies – low cost enforcement targets 
that might bring about relatively substantial benefits to local consumers or businesses in a way that 
makes perceptible the benefits of competition policy and in turn strengthens the authorities’ hand to 
pursue other, often politically sensitive, cases. 
Conclusion 
Attempts at achieving a formal international instrument in competition law have failed on numerous 
occasions for a number of different reasons. One is the fact that competition policy tends to overlap 
with a number of different policy areas and potentially affects numerous policy goals, including 
sensitive areas such as essential services, industry policy and developmental policies more broadly. 
Another is that competition policy is not an area easily susceptible to the formulation of clear rules, 
particularly when we take into account heterogeneity of policy objectives and market and industrial 
contexts across and within different nations. In addition, application of any agreed-to competition 
rules is always very fact intensive. As a result, observing decision-making conduct of national bodies 
and verifying compliance with supranational norms is extremely challenging even for a specialised 
dispute resolution body. 
Given these background factors, perhaps it is unsurprising that when, in face of multiplying antitrust 
regimes around the world, some international cooperation became a necessity, it was channelled 
through a network of competition enforcers. The ICN aimed to be highly informal and, at least at the 
outset, not particularly ambitious in its goals. The aim was to begin an engagement between the 
different antitrust jurisdictions of the world, which might avoid some of the excesses of the 
multiplication of enforcement regimes (such as in cases of merger notification) and provide a forum 
for capacity-building and learning, particularly for officials of emergent jurisdictions. 
Yet in many regulatory networks, whether in the EU or at the international level, the formality or 
informality of the network should not be viewed as an on/off switch. To the contrary, we may speak of 
different dimensions of formality; a point that is sometimes overlooked in the private contract 
literature as well. Thus, we can speak of the formality of the instrument setting up the network (is it 
written, does it aim to be as complete as possible); the formality of deliberations (are there formal 
rules of engagement, discussion, voting); the formality of the normative output (does it produce rules 
or mere guidance as to how officials of member authorities should proceed in individual national 
cases), and the existence and formality of the enforcement mechanisms. As the contract literature 
recognises, parties may decide to formalise certain aspects of their interactions for specific purposes, 
such as the building up their relationship, trust, or generating learning, completely independent of 
enforcing any specific commitments as to final outcomes.
63
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The enthusiasm about transnational networks, including in EU regulation recently, does stem in part 
from their less formal, self-sufficient and therefore more flexible character. This means that such 
networks were much easier to set up in response to concrete problems (such as the increased 
compliance costs on business given the growth of merger control regimes around the world) without 
slow treaty negotiations in which relatively less knowledgeable diplomats had to negotiate and arrive 
at a more or less complete instrument. Moreover, the less formal character also meant that a 
transnational network could quickly change its agenda and focus in cases where the problems faced by 
regulators change. This is an important advantage if we believe that regulators are facing a more 
dynamic environment in which it is difficult ex ante to both predict and provide adequate rules for the 
types of problems that will arise in the future. 
Once we move to the issue of evaluating the efficacy and accountability of these networks, however, 
the different effects of informality and the purposes and effects of formalisation come into sharper 
relief. Thus, in Hadfield’s description of private regimes for internet governance, we notice that 
formalised features become more prominent
64
 and assume a greater significance compared to 
Bernstein’s cotton traders. This is no surprise given that the body of participants in internet 
governance is global and entry and exit is costless, while pre-existing social bonds and mutual 
observability largely non-existent. Yet, ICN cognoscenti tend to describe this network as a 
‘community of interest’,65 presumably as a way of highlighting its specialist make-up and its reliance 
on informal bonds to sustain cooperation.  
We might envisage two very different metaphors for the informal network of regulators as a 
‘community of interest’ for purposes of developing a framework for evaluating efficacy and 
accountability.  
One metaphor might be the ‘choral society’ or ‘bird-watching club’ referred to in the work of Putnam 
and his collaborators on Italy. The metaphor serves the limited purpose of highlighting the point that, 
on this view, we would not be particularly focused or interested in the specific activities and outcomes 
of the regulatory network.
66
 Instead, taking part in the group would in itself be a good thing for 
national officials in that it would generate trust, ‘skills of cooperation’, ‘shared responsibility for 
collective endeavours’, and ‘appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration’.67 On this view, we 
would not be particularly concerned about the evaluation of efficacy of the network, because mere 
participation in events achieves its main purpose. But, irrespective of whether participation in a choral 
society does indeed generate trust among its members and a shared responsibility for the collective, we 
might be sceptical that it would take place in a large and extended network such as the ICN. The 
membership of the ICN is too large and the officials who take part in activities and conferences may 
be transient while their interactions are occasional. Nor is it the case that most of the ICN activities 
involve close hands-on collaboration on joint projects with observable successful outcomes. 
Moreover, the ICN as a community of interest is focused on the design and implementation of 
competition policy. To the extent that it provides a setting for the unstructured learning through private 
conversations or exchanges of draft opinions as between national officials, there would be both 
efficacy and accountability concerns about such learning processes. First, informal two-by-two 
learning is neither stable nor robust. Secondly, in such two-by-two relationships it is not clear what 
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kinds of transfers are taking place because the exchanges do not tend to be transparent or reviewable. 
This is a clear case where improving transparency through the architecture of the international forum 
aids both accountability (of domestic policy officers to domestic publics) and efficacy of 
implementation (by subjecting the transfer that takes place to peer review). 
One other possible metaphor for a purely informal group would be the club or even the cartel.
68
 
Having a restricted number of relatively homogeneous members with very similar preferences and on-
going contact with each other, the cartel seeks to ensure compliance with a very simple norm – such as 
a common price that maximises joint profits – without legal mechanisms available to ensure such 
compliance.  
Again, our discussion suggested substantial caution about the view that a TRN, such as the ICN, can 
be a tool for self-enforcement of global norms. First, most recommended practices elaborated as part 
of the ICN are not simple one-dimensional injunctions. The mechanisms for non-legal enforcement of 
cooperation require modalities to make members’ conduct observable and to characterise it as 
compliant or non-compliant with group norms. This is particularly difficult in diffuse decision-making 
settings, involving very fact-intensive determinations, where the rules are not of the bright-line variety, 
and where the network is not entirely self-sufficient in that there are many relevant decision-makers, 
such as courts or politicians, who operate outside of the network. 
The description of the ICN offered here does not seem to align with either of the above metaphors. 
One advantage of the ICN as a broad-based forum is the fact that officials of member agencies have a 
wealth of experiences and examples available to them to learn from. Moreover, the non-binding nature 
of ICN recommendations would not ordinarily foreclose experimentation and improvement. This also 
presents a limitation, however, since some mechanism is needed to collect information about these 
experiences and to provide a basis for jurisdictions to make a choice in a systematic way. Therefore, 
even in a forum for learning and exchange, certain mechanisms will need to be formalised. From that 
perspective it is encouraging that the ICN formalises its normative output through some information-
gathering, the development of reports and the elaboration of recommended practices. Knowledge 
transfer requires practical knowledge to be made explicit in some way and this in turn makes such 
transfers subject to scrutiny from external stakeholders. While this is preferable as compared to 
unstructured two-by-two or reputation-based learning, this contribution also suggests a word of 
caution about what assumptions are being made both about the current state of the art and about 
harmonisation as a goal in such networks. If we agree, (1) with Christensen,
69
 that experts and leaders 
in current best practices may be blind to solutions which could adequately serve current ‘non-
consumers’, and (2) that some tailoring is required of competition enforcement priorities and 
techniques to different national contexts, there may be reasons for concern about the ICN’s focus on 
ex ante guidance documents. Learning from peers requires mechanisms to make their implementation 
of common norms observable and its consequences subject to review. The kind of tracking of 
implementation currently done by the ICN, such as counting the number of jurisdictions that have 
followed ICN recommended practices in their domestic laws, is not particularly helpful in stimulating 
meaningful learning. What is needed instead is the establishment of mechanisms that link model rules, 
implementation strategies, and outcomes in the different jurisdictions as a basis for further ICN 
deliberations.
70
 Along this dimension, many of the global regulatory networks tend to fall short. 
In the EU context, answering the question of whether EU networks are one channel for the creation of 
a self-sufficient EU private legal order requires precisely the examination of the feedback loops 
between EU networks and domestic agencies and their implementation and enforcement activities.  
But care needs to be taken in interpreting the results, given that the same channels of monitoring, 
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review and characterization can serve more than one purpose or function.  Identifying which is the 
relevant function they serve may well require tracing such feedback loops over time. 
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II.  SELF-SUFFICIENCY THROUGH NARROWING THE POLICY MANDATE 
Introduction 
Competition policy has been called the European Community’s “first supra-national policy1.  To some 
extent, this success is increasingly reflected also at the international level.  Thus, international 
competition lawyers often refer (with some pride) to the exponential growth of the number of 
jurisdictions in the world that have adopted antitrust enforcement regimes since the early 1990s.  
Namely, over 100 national jurisdictions now have some competition law mechanism and in addition 
quite a few regional integration regimes contain competition provisions
2
.  Since industrialized 
countries have been covered by the more established and long-standing antitrust regimes in the US and 
the EU, much of that growth is due to the adoption of competition laws by transition and developing 
economies.  Some of those jurisdictions have adopted or strengthened their competition enforcement 
regimes of their own initiative
3
, however more often such a regime is implemented at the instigation or 
encouragement of international donors and development bodies, such as the World Bank, the IMF
4
 as 
well as the EU
5
.   
While as a result many nations have now adopted such laws, little is known about the effects or 
outcomes of this trend in the developing world
6
.  On the question of effectiveness, interest often tends 
to focus on the question of whether laws are implemented, whether there exist enforcement 
institutions, whether those institutions are active or whether they are regarded as successful by their 
peers in other countries. Yet having a highly active competition authority, which commences many 
investigations, even completes many of them, and collects high levels of fines is only one set of 
indicators of success of a nascent competition regime.  The more fundamental question relates to the 
ultimate outcomes of this proliferation of competition laws in the developing world and the 
relationship to the overall objectives of public policy.  Is this merely another market-opening 
mechanism against poorer nations that serves the trading interests of industrialised nations and their 
multinational companies?  Alternatively, given the overriding importance of developmental objectives 
in these nations, does competition law contribute towards, or at least not detract from the achievement 
of developmental goals, such as the promotion of sustainable growth, the reduction of poverty and 
malnourishment, and the overall increase in human development?  Moreover, are any beneficial 
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effects worth the cost of having a domestic competition regime, or are there other less burdensome and 
more cost effective ways to achieve similar outcomes?   
In this contribution, I explore the relationship between the enforcement of competition law and the 
pursuit of other policy goals related to economic development or social protection, perhaps somewhat 
provocatively, that these two cannot and should not be viewed as separate self-contained regimes.  
While the focus is on development policy, I will use a number of recent developments both in 
advanced and other jurisdictions to point towards this conclusion.  In particular, I will argue that the 
distinctions between competition goals and more dynamic goals of government policy (such as 
innovation, economic development or the protection of social rights of certain groups) are being 
eroded as the conception of competition law, including in advanced jurisdictions, moves away from 
that of a legal instrument that protects a particular market structure or that supports an unqualified 
vision of private autonomy, prioritising atomistic decision-making and market interactions.  Instead, 
competition law may increasingly be viewed as a tool for resolving the problems of industrial 
organization more generally
7
.  Moreover, the problems that competition law seeks to address cannot 
be described along a single dimension, such as the size (or “bigness”) of firms, the opportunistic hold-
up in relationships with specific investments, or even price fixing and collusion.  Experience, evidence 
and theory have taught us that there may be good and bad reasons for, and outcomes from, both large 
firms and inter-firm collaboration. 
The view presented in this contribution offers both an optimistic view about competition law as the 
“law of development” and reason for caution.  To the extent that there is no distinction between 
competition goals and developmental goals, the trend towards the adoption of competition laws in the 
developing world is a salutary one.  Competition law can be calibrated to the contextual policy goals 
or development needs of specific jurisdictions and does not need to take a back seat in the period of 
pursuit of development, so as to gain greater prominence in a “post-development” stage.  And the 
point of caution relates precisely to this calibration.  A richer conception of the goals of competition 
law implies a more varied panoply of tools through which to pursue them.  In particular, when 
developing nations adopt a competition law they tend to import the existing templates or categories 
contained in the laws and administrative regimes of the advanced jurisdictions – anticompetitive 
agreements, some form of abuse of dominance and a merger control regime.  But the meaning and 
significance of these categories has not been fixed and stable over time even in the mature regimes – 
certain aspects of anticompetitive conduct have been emphasized more at different times and in 
different industrial and production settings.  Therefore, the importation of such categories may not be 
a good guide to the kinds of problems new adopters are likely to face and which of those are likely to 
be particularly salient to their own context and to the achievement of developmental objectives.  
Moreover, this kind of import may lead to early encrustations of analytical and decision-making 
routines for nascent antitrust authorities that may not be particularly useful, but that nonetheless 
become difficult to dislodge over time.  In the absence of local tradition and accumulated knowledge 
and in an effort to mimic their colleagues from other jurisdictions, officials of newer authorities may 
establish a routinised approach to analysing problems and deciding cases or they may establish 
enforcement priorities that do not reflect the local development context.  The challenge for those who 
promote competition enforcement in the developing world is to identify the salience of local 
competition problems and their relationship to developmental objectives, rather than to either 
speculate about competition law objectives at high levels of generality
8
 or to be wedded to established 
antitrust categories.  
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Competition Law and the Importance of Dynamics 
Competition law as we know it today is the product of western industrialised nations. Mature antitrust 
jurisdictions, namely the US and the EU, have also been the principal proselytizers for the adoption of 
antitrust by other nations.  In post-War period, US efforts to extend the reach of antitrust laws are well 
documented.  The US advocated the adoption of antitrust laws, particularly among its European 
trading partners.  For instance, the US was largely responsible for the implementation of a competition 
law in post-War West Germany and Japan, as well as the entrenchment of the competition provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome.  US advocacy was consistent with the then regnant view of antitrust as a tool 
for maintaining a decentralised economy, which was also democracy-enforcing because of the link 
between the accumulation of economic and political power.  Thus, the US imposition of antitrust laws 
on countries such as Germany or Japan, where pre-War totalitarian regimes had flourished, was not 
accidental
9
.  
Apart from advocating or imposing the adoption of antitrust laws, the US also enforced its own 
antitrust laws extraterritorially, based on the effects doctrine, enforcement that once again, principally 
affected its key trading partners in Europe.  Such extraterritorial extension of American values, 
through decisions of US litigants and courts, was resisted by the European nations.  Their resistance 
was based, in part, on the interference of this type of enforcement with domestic policy-making with 
what we might call development objectives.  In particular, arrangements among economic operators 
(including often competitors) may seem anticompetitive through the eyes of US courts and yet can be 
carefully calibrated arrangements among various social groups, often sponsored or supported by state 
policy, which seek to promote a balance of policy goals, including product quality and innovation, 
consumer protection, workable competition as well as stability in production and employment
10
.   
While it was the US that was to a considerable extent responsible for the inclusion of the antitrust 
provisions at the establishment of the European Community, the EU is regarded today as the other 
principal competition regime in the world.  More recently, the EU has been the jurisdiction at the 
forefront of efforts both to induce other nations to adopt domestic or regional competition laws and to 
create an international competition instrument.  The EU has been particularly successful in such 
efforts for a number of reasons.  First, the processes of association and enlargement of the EU have 
brought a number of jurisdictions directly under the purview of the EU competition regime.  Secondly, 
rather than relying merely on extraterritorial enforcement, the EU has used its trading and economic 
relationships with other nations, as well as technical and other assistance, to induce them to adopt 
domestic laws or to subject them to some supranational obligations. 
Despite these successes in bilateral settings, the EU failed in its efforts to include a competition 
instrument in the WTO agenda, as part of the package of the so-called Singapore issues.  The US had 
never been particularly enthusiastic about being subjected to international antitrust rules more 
restrictive than its own, but it was developing nations that most strongly resisted the introduction of 
antitrust obligations in the WTO regime
11
.  Developing nations were concerned about the extent to 
which a relatively unfamiliar set of antitrust obligations would be used as a tool for asymmetric market 
access for industrialised nation products, while at the same time impeding their autonomy to 
implement policies pursuing developmental goals.  An additional concern related to the balance of 
enforcement priorities of their domestic institutions if they become subject to an international antitrust 
instrument.  To avoid the breaching of international obligations domestic authorities might have to 
prioritise conduct of interest to foreign economic operators, while at the same time not having the 
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resources or capacity to impose obligations and remedies on conduct of multinationals that 
significantly impacts domestic firms and consumers.  This only heightened the suspicion that antitrust 
could be used as another tool for the asymmetric opening of markets placing developing nations at a 
disadvantage. 
The academic debate stirred by the trends towards the adoption of competition law and its 
internationalisation focused on the issue of whether developing nations needed a competition law at all 
and, if so, what kind.  In an oft-cited contribution, Laffont expressed scepticism about such a need 
based on the view that “it is not always the case that competition should be encouraged in 
[developing] countries” given the structure of their economies12.  Furthermore, implementing a 
competition enforcement regime is both complex and costly, particularly in light of institutional and 
administrative weaknesses faced by those nations
13
.  While in some cases competition enforcement 
might bring some benefits to developing nations, much of the benefits of competitive pressure could 
also be delivered through strictly enforced disciplines of international trade liberalization
14
.  If the 
trading regime can guarantee access of imports to domestic markets, this can have the effect of 
disentrenching incumbent market power and disciplining domestic players.   
Even at the conceptual level, the prescription that trade liberalisation is a sufficient substitute for 
competition enforcement faces two immediate shortcomings.  The first is the fact that free trade does 
not in any way ensure competitive markets in non-tradeables, which may represent quite a significant 
share of the economy.  The second is the fact that trade rules only impose obligations upon states and 
therefore can be circumvented by private arrangements seeking to block market access to foreign 
competitors, thus undoing the effects of trade liberalisation
15
. 
Another set of arguments advanced more fundamental objections to the push for competition 
enforcement and an international competition instrument.  For instance, in a number of contributions, 
Singh sought to justify the developing nations’ opposition to the EU proposal for a uniform 
competition instrument under the WTO umbrella, arguing that this was an ill-conceived idea that 
would disserve the interests of developing nations. Singh argued that any “one-size-fits all” instrument 
would not adequately deal with the heterogeneous circumstances and development needs of such 
nations
16
.  Specifically, he argued that an emphasis on competition enforcement in developing nations 
may be premature and may in fact inhibit their capacity to pursue development objectives.  Instead, he 
suggested that East Asian late industrialising economies, such as Japan and South Korea, offered a 
more appropriate template for the sequencing of different policy tools for nations facing development 
challenges
17
.   
According to Singh, these economies did not emphasize competition enforcement in the stages of 
early industrialization, during which time development goals prevailed over competition goals.  This 
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also meant that industrial policy in these nations “dominated competition policy during their 
developmental phases i.e. if there was a conflict between the two, industrial policy prevailed”18.  
According to this view, while competition policy has static goals, such as reducing prices for 
consumers, industry policy has dynamic goals, such as increasing investment, which requires stable 
profits
19.  On Singh’s retelling of the relevant history, the state in these economies restricted imports 
and foreign investment, providing a captive market for domestic firms, which together with lax 
competition enforcement guaranteed high profits that could be used to “undertake high rates of 
investment, to improve the quality of their products, and … to capture markets abroad”20.  It is only as 
development goals become achieved, with sufficient levels of industrial output and income per capita, 
that the state can begin to emphasize competition goals to ensure domestic competitive markets as a 
discipline on the now-established market players.  In general, however, given the importance of 
dynamic (over static) efficiency for developing countries, coherence between policies will “involve 
competition policy being subordinated to the industrial policy during the course of economic 
development”21.  In other words, competition law is not the law that leads to development, but instead 
premature enforcement of competition law may impede the achievement of developmental objectives.   
Such a view of a trade-off between competition and development goals, finds some support in the 
competition law doctrines of advanced antitrust regimes as well.  In the US for instance, the intensity 
of antitrust enforcement has varied to take account of changing economic circumstances
22
.  However, 
even in times when the purpose of antitrust was viewed as broader and more open-ended, both 
judges
23
 and commentators
24
 stated, sometimes in quite emphatic terms, that in deciding antitrust cases 
the focus must remain on the goal of promoting competition and that courts cannot forsake the goal of 
competition for other policy goals.  The implication of this position appears to be that other goals are 
to be pursued by targeted interventions.  The narrowing of the goals of antitrust policy, inspired by the 
so-called Chicago revolution, to harm to consumer welfare through an increase in short run prices has 
only further exacerbated (at least conceptually) the compartmentalisation of competition policy in the 
US to static efficiency goals.  
Similarly, in the EU the Treaty of Rome entrenched the competition provisions as foundational 
principles from the very beginning of the Community.  At the same time, however, the Treaty 
provided an apparent outlet route in what is now Art. 101(3) TFEU, a provision which allows for some 
anticompetitive arrangements to be exempted from the operation of the Art. 101(1) prohibition, if the 
undertakings involved could establish the agreement or practice in question “contributes to improving 
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”.  In the 
original implementation Regulation 17/62, the Commission (in the exercise of its administrative role) 
had the monopoly of granting such exemptions.  Thus, while in the EU regime the trading off of goals 
was integrated into the competition decision-making, this methodology does reinforce the view that 
the pursuit of public policy goals relating to economic progress and development may justify the 
suppression of competition goals.   
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Much ink has been spilled on the question of the appropriate goals of competition policy and the range 
of views of different schools of antitrust thought to this issue. In some formulations, antitrust policy 
should be enforced without reference to outcomes.  This approach emphasizes the autonomy of 
economic actors to make individual business decisions, absent agreements with or coercion from other 
traders or powerful firms.  Favouring such a decentralised or atomistic economic landscape might be a 
value in itself, pace economic outcomes, and might also be beneficial to democracy if we believe that 
decentralised (as opposed to concentrated) economic power is incapable of dominating or completely 
capturing political processes.  But then there are also clear potential benefits to cooperation and 
integration in modern economic life, particularly once we move beyond craft production destined for 
local buyers towards more complex industrial products that may have to be marketed to more distant 
markets.  Autonomous decision-making by atomistic agents may be one value a community cares for 
(and this may not even be universally true across different communities), but there are many others, 
including not just lower prices, but also new and improved products, reduced poverty and 
malnourishment, sustainable exploitation of the local environment, improved access to water or public 
transport and so on.  
The recognition that, in implementing competition law, various goals may need to be pursued 
simultaneously has at least three implications.  First, it amplifies the problem caused by the absence of 
absolute markers that signal the need for competition intervention, such as firm size, market share, 
market structure or even types of conduct.  Secondly, it makes decision-making multi-dimensional and 
therefore more complex.  Finally, as a consequence of the first two, it puts an even greater strain on 
the institutions for implementation of law policy and this is precisely the area where developing 
economies often suffer from considerable weaknesses.   
It is worth noting at this point that these problems are not limited to developing nations and have 
increasingly taken centre-stage in advanced competition regimes such as the US and the EU. In the 
US, the historical and ideological background to the antitrust laws, as well as their undifferentiated 
application through the generalist courts has made antitrust doctrine receptive to attempts to narrow 
the focus of interventions by essentially providing a safe harbour for conduct which is unlikely to 
produce an increase in consumer prices.  While EU competition law has been more open to a 
heterodox interpretation of its purposes, in the inception the Treaty competition provisions were used 
quite instrumentally and quite narrowly to break down private barriers to the creation of the internal 
market.  In other words, for a long time EU policy prioritised one particular type of competition 
namely cross-border competition that would challenge national systems of production and distribution.    
More recently however, both of these mature regimes have had to deal with cases that challenge 
narrow conceptions of competition enforcement
25.  The antitrust scrutiny of Microsoft’s practices in 
the operating system and adjacent products, which had its iterations both in the US and the EU, placed 
enforcers and courts face-to-face with the production ecology of the new economy, characterized by 
on-going innovation, collaboration and information flows across firm boundaries.  In particular, these 
cases brought to the fore the fact that the main forms of competition in these settings are dynamic, 
based not on price, but on the ability to deliver new and improved products to market.  Moreover, 
rapidly changing technology strains the static tools of antitrust economics, by making product 
boundaries unstable and the sources of competitive threat matters of judgment rather than inference 
from current data
26
. 
The focus on innovation in such cases has had a number of implications for the implementation of 
competition law even in mature regimes.  First, it puts in sharp relief the fact that even an efficiency 
based competition policy need not solely focus on static allocative efficiency, but also on dynamic 
efficiency, particularly given that dynamic change over time makes a far more important contribution 
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to economic growth and performance.  Secondly, it suggests caution about short term prices as the sole 
criterion for competition intervention partly because competition can take place along many different 
dimensions
27
, not only price.  Moreover, certain aspects of products and services may take consumers 
(and other players in the regulation game, such as administrators or legislators) a longer time to learn 
about or appreciate as a relevant dimension.
28
  Finally, such cases make it necessary to confront the 
non-linear (or networked) inter-firm relationships in the context of complex products and applications, 
in which there are intermingled both competitive and collaborative aspects and where innovation, 
production and distribution proceed continuously and simultaneously, rather than in stages
29
.  
To be able to respond to antitrust problems in a dynamic environment, the advanced regimes have also 
had to search for ways to relax the constraints of the standard implementation tools for competition 
law.  The remedies implemented in both the US and the EU to deal with the Microsoft litigation put 
into place mechanisms through which to re-establish cooperation and ensure inter-operability in the 
markets under scrutiny and to remove bottlenecks to innovation.  The difficulties of organising 
production based on collaboration between independent units are staple fare in the industrial 
organisation literature
30
.  Arguably, these interventions and remedies were not based either on an 
absolute distrust of business size or market concentration, nor on an absolute faith in business 
autonomy, but instead were attempts at solving concrete problems that arose in a particular production 
ecology.  As such, antitrust or competition policy may be regarded as a more generic tool to resolve 
problems in industrial organization so as to advance the public interest
31
.  It follows that in such 
settings the once (at least conceptually) firm line between competition policy and innovation policy 
tends to become blurred. 
This brief detour into some recent examples of competition enforcement in advanced jurisdictions also 
sheds some light on the issue of the sequencing of policy implementation in developing nations.  In 
particular, to achieve developmental objectives, do developing nations need to subsume the 
enforcement of competition laws to the implementation of industry policy?  If it is true that the line 
between competition and industrial policy is being blurred by the focus on innovation and dynamic 
effects in competition enforcement in advanced regimes, it may be that developing nations need not be 
subject to this sequencing choice either.  Unless of course we can argue that developing nations’ 
circumstances are different justifying a different policy prescription.  In the next section, I argue that 
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this is not the case by relying on both some contemporary arguments and a reference to the historical 
“templates” discussed by Singh. 
Competition Law and Developmental Objectives 
Apart from the controversies presented thus far, a number of arguments have been advanced in the 
literature about the ways in which competition law enforcement can assist developing nations in the 
attainment of their developmental objectives.  Brusick and Evenett, for example, have pointed to the 
fact that abuses of dominance are frequently alleged in developing nations against firms that provide 
key infrastructure, such as energy, telecommunications, banking and transport, whether state-owned or 
private.  To the extent that such conduct leads to higher prices and lower quality, this “negatively 
affect[s] the efficiency of exporters and producers downstream and hence act[s] as a break to 
development”32.  Along a different dimension, McMahon highlights evidence that developing nations 
are disproportionately affected by international cartels, which raise price of staple commodities and 
can affect developmental goals both by hurting consumers directly and by raising costs of local 
producers and exporters
33
.  Finally, competition law can also be a tool with which to prise open local 
distribution channels, where they are foreclosed by powerful economic and political interests
34
.   
Note however, that none of the above cases need involve a conflict or a trade-off between the 
competition goals (even if limited to static efficiency goals) and the goals of development.  Therefore, 
they are not inconsistent with Singh’s suggestion of subordinating competition policy to industry 
policy where a conflict arises.  If there exists a competition law and an enforcement authority, the 
authority should proceed against such cases (assuming it has the possibility of implementing an 
effective remedy, which is a different issue altogether), since competition enforcement works 
synergistically with and supports industry policy. 
But what about those cases where there is an apparent trade-off?  In cases where in the sector that is 
supposed to provide the elevator for living standards through industrialisation and exports, the 
achievement of such a result requires protecting the prices and profits of local firms?  It is precisely in 
those cases that Singh would suggest subordinating competition policy to industry policy.  This is 
because the basis of the developmental strategy in the East Asian nations, according to Singh, was the 
use of domestic consumers as a captive market while firms in the industrialising sector build up scale, 
experience and knowledge to be able to capture and expand into exporting markets.   
From the very outset, using such a policy prescription in many developing nations is faced with the 
problem that domestic markets may well be too small, both in absolute terms, but also specifically for 
the potential export, for this industrialization strategy to work. If one thinks of recent developers based 
on high technology products for example, such as Ireland or Israel, the information technology sector 
was from the very outset targeted to exports and the domestic market would have been relatively 
insufficient to be a springboard for growth.  As such, allowing harm to domestic consumers through 
lax competition enforcement may well not translate into the achievement of development goals down 
the track. 
Even more fundamentally, shielding the industrialising sector from imports was another key part of 
the successful strategies in the East Asian template as presented by Singh.  Indeed, if the key is to 
protect prices and profits of domestic firms, there seems to be no point in lax competition enforcement 
domestically, if the industrialising or development sector is subject to competition from imports.  But 
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in a world where successive rounds of trade liberalisation have taken place over the last couple of 
decades and there are legal restrictions on raising protectionist barriers, it may not be feasible to 
implement an industrial policy that hinges critically on shielding domestic firms from imports for a 
period during which they can build-up competitive strength and perhaps recoup some of the outlays 
involved in the investments in industrial equipment.   
Many in the development advocacy community have, consistently with Singh’s arguments, raised their 
voices against the rash extension of competition policy to developing nations
35
.  But there have also 
been prominent voices supporting the view that credible implementation of competition and consumer 
protection laws in developing nations can make a meaningful and positive contribution to the 
achievement of development goals.   
For instance, the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) has a specific mission of extending 
competition and consumer protection laws and ensuring that they are effectively implemented in 
developing nations. CUTS is a non-governmental organisation, which seeks to advance development 
goals through the promotion of vibrant competition enforcement in developing nations.  Among its 
missions with respect to competition and consumer protection, CUTS includes the following: 
“[p]romoting fair markets to enhance consumer welfare” and  “enabl[ing] people, in particular women, 
to achieve their right to basic needs and sustainable development through a strong consumer 
movement”36.  As part of pursuing those missions, since 2003 CUTS has founded a Centre for 
Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation
37
, which has initiated projects examining 
competition enforcement in a number of different sectors (healthcare, pharmaceuticals, sectoral 
regulation) and in different regions of the developing world (India, Africa etc)
38
.  As one CUTS 
official explained in an interview, the activities of CUTS are based on the premise that “healthy 
competition” can lead to “not only lower prices, better quality, better availability, but very 
importantly … good governance”39. 
The approach followed by CUTS is to build bottom up support for competition policy enforcement, 
and this approach is animated by two related rationales.  First, if a broader set of stakeholders, 
including movements promoting development goals and government authorities in general, perceive 
the benefits of competitive markets, it will also be easier for competition authorities to do their work.  
Secondly, in recognition that policy implementation and effectiveness is often the weak point in the 
developing world, CUTS aims to “build up that kind of awareness and that kind of a movement, which 
continues to pressurize the authorities … to draft a law, adopt a law, including [to] go ahead 
implementing it”.  In other words, the aim is to contribute towards the creation of a “watch-dog” to 
ensure “that the law functions”40.  Thus, as opposed to the conditionality approach often followed by 
developing nations’ foreign partners (including industrialized nations and donor organizations), 
organizations such as CUTS work to domesticate the competition enforcement regime, a key step for 
moving from the law on the books to law in action, as it builds internal support and monitoring for the 
implementation of competition policies.   
This approach goes against the view that competition policy enforcement comes later in the sequence 
to industrialization policies promoting developmental goals.  On that issue, the CUTS official 
specifically noted that even assuming this story of shielding domestic firms from competition 
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(domestic or foreign) as a form of industry policy presents an accurate depiction of the 
industrialization process in Japan and Korea, the problem is that “those times have gone” in light of 
the on-going trade liberalisation that has taken place already and the commitments that have been 
taken on within the WTO.  From the development perspective, even if competition is not the sole force 
that promotes developmental goals, the CUTS collocutor suggested that there may well be lower 
awareness of the benefits from competition in many developing nations.  This is because economic 
and personal or family affairs can often be related and deeply entwined
41
 or to use the words of 
Rodrik, because economic life often proceeds as part and parcel of “traditional entanglements”42. 
Development Theory and Policy 
Arguably, the challenge for development policy has always been to overcome different bottlenecks, 
whether industrial organisation, governance or social, to economic growth and progress, while 
simultaneously defining an appropriate role, if any, for the state in that process.
43
  In other words, it is 
about fashioning a mix of mechanisms for the improved transformation of inputs to outputs and the 
appropriate distribution of the latter, so as to contribute towards an alleviation of poverty and an 
increase in various aspects of human development. 
Traditionally, theorising about development was based on the view that developing nations were stuck 
in a low-growth equilibrium and debates focused on what kinds of policies a government could 
implement to escape that equilibrium
44
.  These debates had a largely macroeconomic focus.  Thus, one 
view was that governments should promoting balanced growth by way of “a coordinated, broadly 
based investment program” in various sectors of the economy (or in Krugman’s words the “Big 
Push”)45.  The alternative view was that governments should focus on unbalanced growth, by 
promoting investment in a single sector that then sets off a further chain of upstream and downstream 
investments.  In other words, government policy should promote investment in “a few key sectors with 
strong linkages, then moving on to other sectors” to correct the resulting imbalances46. 
As Rodrik has recounted, after a period of dormancy development theory subsequently turned 
neoclassical with an emphasis on microeconomic factors, and specifically relative prices as signals for 
economic activity that would produce economic development.  This shift was both the result of the 
perceived lack of success of prior policies, changing intellectual fads, but it was also based on 
evidence that even in developing nations “investment decisions, agricultural production, exports 
[were] quite sensitive to price incentives”47.  In other words, during the 1980s development policy also 
turns neo-liberal, with a focus on price reform through liberalization and privatization programmes as 
a way of improving the micro signals to which economic actors must respond.  Yet according to 
Rodrik, in a number of different settings this turn towards a focus on liberalization of price signals also 
had either unsatisfactory or disastrous consequences.  In turn, such experiences “served to reveal the 
institutional underpinnings of market economies” and therefore “put institutions squarely on the 
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agenda of reformers”48.  This, of course, includes the enforcement of competition law, given the 
recognised failures associated with private monopoly, although it also included other kinds of sectoral 
regulation, supervision of financial and credit markets, as well as a broader focus on good governance 
by, for instance, limiting the opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption.  Given the conditionality 
mindset of international development advisors and donors, these various regimes are often seen as 
self-contained boxes of regulation
49
 that have to be “ticked” (ie, put in place) by developing nations.  
In other words, they are part of a set of pre-conditions that, when put in place, may unleash the 
development potential of poor countries. 
Rodrik argues that production in poor countries is sensitive to price incentives, but only “as long as 
these are perceived to have some predictability”50.  We can think of the various regulatory regimes 
discussed above as mechanisms to ensure that price signals are not distorted and are more predictable; 
opportunities to respond to such signals by altering production decisions will not be foreclosed or 
expropriated by monopolists or monopsonists, or politically well-connected economic actors and so 
on. 
But just as unleashing price signals is not a panacea, nor is ticking the boxes for enacted regulatory 
regimes.  The first reason is obvious:  formally adopting a regulatory regime and appointing a 
regulator does not guarantee that the regulator will function effectively in implementing regulation or 
that the regime will not be captured in some way by those whom it is meant to constrain.  The second 
reason is less obvious:  even an effective regulatory regime only removes a set of forces that might 
distort price signals or make them unstable.  There are myriad reasons why prices may shift – a shift in 
preferences or technology, the emergence of an alternative source of supply.  For local actors to make 
investments that favour growth, they need reliable and robust information on the basis of which to 
make decisions about where best to direct those investments and then how to continue to make those 
products that are valued in markets
51
. 
In offering a way forward, we might seek to synthesize the various perspectives on the elaboration of 
development and competition policy.  One is the notion that development is favoured by a coordinated 
“push” in investment52 based on the apparent common ground that “firms pursuing growth strategies 
together … were more likely to succeed than firms in isolation”53.  According to Krugman, 
coordinated investment would be more likely to produce economies of scale and other externalities 
that would push the industry “over the threshhold of profitability”54.  Along similar lines, Singh 
emphasizes the “coordination of investment activities” and argues that this was the “essential role of 
government” in the East Asian developers “during their developmental phase”55.  
But, as Sabel points out, apart from the coordination function there is also the task of acquiring and 
supplying the relevant information to those firms on what to produce and how. 
On Singh’s view about the proper sequencing of competition law enforcement in the developing 
nation, the state plays the coordination function of stimulating investments by sheltering the firms in 
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the industrializing sector from competition allowing cartelization and protecting their profits
56
.  This, 
in turn, helps them to become internationally competitive exporters down the track.  But this beneficial 
outcome would only result if the local firms take advantage of this sheltering in order to learn to 
produce that which world markets demand and to deliver such products at adequate quality and price 
levels.  Alternatively, firms may take advantage of sheltering policies to protect their profits, while the 
expected export performance never materializes; which may be a much more familiar story.  If 
improved export performance does not materialize, this could be either because the domestic firms 
failed to learn to produce well that for which there was market demand.  But they could also argue that 
market circumstances have changed, and that the policy of sheltering needs to continue to allow the 
firms to adjust to new circumstances and so on. 
To understand whether the policy of sheltering is working to achieve goals of industrialization or 
development and whether it needs to be continued or adjusted in some way, the government itself 
needs tools with which to evaluate those claims.  In the absence of such tools, a policy of sheltering 
firms from competition and protecting their profitability can continue, imposing costs on local 
consumers and on the government budget without necessarily achieving improved export 
performance.   
This brings us back to the issue of who supplies the information to the exporting sector as to which 
goods and how to produce them.  One view might be that it is the state that must do this as part of the 
coordination function and this seems to be at least an unstated assumption of those who offer the 
export-led route to development of countries such as Japan or the East Asian tigers as a model for 
other developing nations to follow.  But, as Sabel points out, such a view of the role of the state 
suggests at least three limitations in using this template for development.  First, there is no reason in 
principle to believe that the state or the bureaucracy would have better access to such information as 
compared to firms
57
.  Secondly, even if the Japanese or the South Korean bureaucracy did for some 
reason have better access to such information, this may not be the case for many of the nations 
currently still stuck at a low levels of economic growth and development and at the same time facing 
serious governance and institutional limitations.  Finally, even if this type of sheltering is appropriate, 
the state must also decide for how long to continue such a policy and when to end it, either if it is not 
bearing fruit or if it is no longer needed (particularly if it is also imposing costs on domestic 
consumers).  Firms that benefit from the policy, after all, can seek to strategically supply information 
in an effort to continue the rents they receive from this policy, irrespective of whether they need it or 
they are indeed improving their productive and export performance.   
Role of Associations, Strategic Contests, Stimulating Rivalry 
It follows then that the state in the developmental context faces serious obstacles to acting as the key 
actor that steers the growth of export industries.  It seems that the state has to stimulate the private 
sector to generate relevant knowledge that will enable private sector firms to produce goods that are 
valued and competitive in world markets and to ensure that such knowledge is also available to the 
administration so that it can evaluate the performance of the policy.  Note that to achieve both of those 
purposes, it would seem preferable to foster a diversity of sources of such information or knowledge.  
If all firms were pursuing precisely the same strategy, the consequences of error would be disastrous.  
Moreover, it is much easier for the state to be captured by a unanimous view. 
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Authors have pointed in particular to the importance of associations of firms in the process of 
implementing export-led development policies in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  
Thus, in discussing the coordination role of the state, Sabel emphasizes not so much the protection of 
domestic firm profits, but the learning aspect and the diffusion of learning via sectoral associations of 
firms.  Specifically, he notes that state bureaucracies would cede regulatory authority or grant various 
forms of aid or subsidies only where members of firm associations could demonstrate technical 
expertise, knowledge of market prospects as well as the capacity to generate knowledge about 
continuous and robust improvement in practices
58
.  This is neither a mere cartelisation policy to 
protect the profits of local firms, nor a typical national champions policy, where only one or a small 
number of firms are selected as the subjects of the state’s support.  Instead, a key function of such a 
sectoral associations is precisely to disseminate knowledge so as to improve the performance of all 
members, including those that might lag behind best practices
59
.  Importantly, knowledge generated in 
this way is also available to the bureaucracy as one way of ensuring that such associations do not 
subvert the public interest to that of the members.   
This view of the coordinating role of the state, not as a protector of profits, but the facilitator of 
dynamic learning and the dissemination of best practices suggests that competition policy is not 
subordinated to, but integrated with developmental policy.  Moreover, such a view of the relationship 
between competition law and development policy takes on an even greater significance in the current, 
even more globalised and disintegrated production context.  As the interviewed CUTS official 
emphasised, nations must adjust developmental policies to the contemporary realities in trade and 
production
60
.  Increasing trade liberalization puts a constraint on purely protectionist policies.   Even 
more fundamentally, trade liberalisation has led to the fragmentation of production processes, resulting 
in the emergence of global value chains or production networks
61
.  For firms wishing to participate in 
those production networks, it is not necessarily scale that provides a key advantage, but flexibility and 
the ability to adapt to circumstances that can change quickly, which in turn requires an ability to learn 
quickly and to change course in response if needed.  Firms from small developing nations with small 
markets may not be able to rely on cartelisation of domestic market and then wait to build up 
performance before seeking to access the international market and they may not need to.  Instead, such 
firms can seek to plug into global production chains directly even at a relatively small scale.  Yet, it 
would still be the case that accessing foreign opportunities could be done easier in concert with other 
firms, given the logic of externalities in production, and multiple opportunities for learning and 
sources of error-correction.  Again, inter-firm coordination or information-sharing may also be sources 
for antitrust concern and such concerns could be legitimate.  Competition policy need not be dormant; 
instead a dynamically minded competition policy would seek to understand whether learning and 
improved capacities to produce and participate into global production networks result from such 
practices or not.   
In a study of developing strategies for late-developing nations, such as Ireland, Israel and Taiwan 
through their exploitation of opportunities in the IT industries, Breznitz points out that precisely the 
fragmentation in production globally provides “multiple entry points and ways to succeed” even 
within a single industry.  Moreover given rapid rates of technological change, an export-led 
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development strategy could not rely on the state picking a sector and patiently waiting for selected 
firms to invest so as to achieve economies of scale and to efficiently supply an established and well-
developed market by catching up to current technology
62
. In the IT industry, “the industry itself 
becomes the creation and rapid application of new technologies”63.   
In such a setting, the role and mode of state intervention to achieve developmental goals will need to 
adjust as well.  Specifically, from the perspective of the role of competition policy vis-à-vis 
developmental goals, Breznitz suggests that the role of the state is to “motivate private companies to 
make long-term commitments to operate in rapid innovation-based industries”64.  Implementing such a 
policy, however, requires recognition that innovation is an “inherently collective endeavor”, which is 
both “iterative and cooperative in nature”.  In other words, there is a need to coordinate activities 
across firm boundaries, and to motivate and facilitate learning (including joint learning) by such 
private firms.  Again, the developmental state here faces a dilemma in that policies aimed at 
coordinating and motivating innovation and learning can also result in rent-seeking, capture, 
foreclosure, together with stagnancy and domestic consumer harm with little or no improved export 
performance.  The role of the developmental bureaucracy then is more challenging, since just like 
industry players, it must be capable of implementing and revising policies in the face of on-going 
change
65
.  If industry players cooperate and use state incentives in a way in which improves their 
capability to innovate robustly and deliver products to market, they are advancing the goals of both 
development policy (economic growth and human development) and competition policy (in the form 
of dynamic efficiency).  If on the other hand local firms simply lobby for state protection or subsidies 
and, under the pretext of cooperation, seek to foreclose entry and simply exploit domestic consumers, 
neither development nor competition goals are being achieved.   
One challenge, particularly for states with weak governance structures, is how to best create the state 
institutions for such dynamically minded intervention.  In the contexts he studies, Breznitz describes 
this as a process of industry-state co-evolution, whereby the (developmental) bureaucracy ends up 
“less Weberian”: more fragmented, less isolated and closer to industry66.  This observation squarely 
poses a set of questions about the creation of sectoral (or vertical) regimes with narrowly defined 
objectives as opposed to regimes with horizontal objectives that cut across sectors, such as 
developmental or competition bureaucracies.  Dividing up oversight responsibilities does multiply 
sources of knowledge for the state, while perhaps making capture more difficult.  At the same time 
having a number of different self-sufficient sectoral regimes or even regimes that cut across sectors, 
but with narrowly defined (intermediate) charges and little opportunity for exchange, can also mean 
that they end up impeding each other in the achievement of the ultimate objectives of development.   
Formulating the argument in this way raises questions about the kind of advice provided by 
international donors and advisers about the creation of mechanisms for state intervention in 
developing nations.  While that specific issue is beyond the scope of the paper, the argument as 
presented does suggest that effective regulatory mechanisms do not precede and “unleash”, but go 
hand in hand with improved economic performance for the development sector.  Moreover, it lends 
support to the argument that harmonisation of international antitrust norms based on a thin consensus 
principle, such as a suspicion of horizontal coordination, could unwittingly foreclose mechanisms for 
building up the competitiveness of local firms and their capacity to plug into global production 
networks. 
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Competition Law and the Fundamentals of Human Development 
The discussion so far has followed the traditional debate on the interaction between development 
policy and competition law, namely focusing on the goal of development by stimulating the 
emergence of an industrial sector vis-à-vis traditional and subsistence activities in developing nations.  
To close the circle, in this section we focus on the recent interest in the use of competition policy for 
the advancement of more immediate human development objectives.  One prominent example of such 
application of competition law was the case by the South African Competition Commission against 
pharmaceutical companies for their marketing practices for HIV medicines, based on theories such as 
excessive pricing or the denial of an essential facility
67
.  This is an instance in which rather than 
focusing on economic objectives, such as consumer welfare, or employment or innovation, 
competition policy can be used to more directly influence living conditions in the developing world by 
improving health standards and life expectancy
68
. 
Such a precedent has inspired thinking about the use of competition law in similar settings so as to 
improve access to basic necessities in developing nations.  Specifically, in a briefing note the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has posed the question whether competition law should be 
used to address concentration and abuse of power problems in food supply chains as a way of 
promoting access to food and the fulfilment of the right to food in the developing world
69
.  Many 
farmers from the developing world supply primary agricultural commodities within global food supply 
chains, of the kind described in the previous section.  As de Schutter notes, while both farmers and 
final consumers of primary agricultural commodities are numerous and dispersed, the participants in 
the middle steps of the supply chain (commodity buyers, food processors and retailers) tend to be 
considerably more concentrated.  Such concentration gives these intermediate buyers the capacity to 
depress the prices of primary agricultural products, thereby lowering the incomes of farm producers in 
the developing world
70
.  Similarly, buyers such as retailers can seek to pass on costs of compliance 
with (often private) standards on hygiene or food safety.  The combined effect of these reductions in 
the effective income for developing nation farmers is for them “to be kicked off” global supply chains, 
which in turn increases rural poverty and reduces access to food even for agricultural producers
71
. 
The use of competition law to address this problem of so-called “buyer power”, according to de 
Schutter
72
, faces the limitation that modern competition regimes focus on the welfare of final 
consumers as an important, even a key variable in determining the existence of an antitrust violation.  
While practices by intermediary buyers directed at farmers may reduce the income of producers in the 
developing world, if this conduct leads to lower prices of products on supermarket shelves, it may well 
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enhance the welfare of final consumers, thus pitting the interests of rich nation consumers against poor 
nation farm producers.  Both de Schutter and Ganesh
73
 offer a number of suggestions as to how 
competition decision-makers and other bodies may seek to navigate that conflict, but for the purposes 
of the present discussion there are three key points worth noting in understanding the role that 
competition law could play in this aspect of economic development. 
One suggestion in their analysis of food supply chain practices is that the high concentration of the 
intermediary stages in the chain allow cartelization by the buyers, namely joint concerted action to 
depress the prices received by developing nation farmers.  However, such conduct would likely be 
caught under the antitrust laws of most mature regimes which typically prohibit any form of concerted 
action by competitors purely for the purpose of jointly fixing prices between competitors.  Admittedly, 
if such a case was brought in the courts of an industrialised nation, where only final consumers are 
located, there may be an attempt to raise a jurisdictional issue based on the issue where the harmful 
effects of the conduct were suffered. 
However, the second and more significant problem is that given the high degrees of concentration 
among intermediate agricultural buyers, as well as the weak market and bargaining power of the 
sellers (who tend to be small and dispersed farmers in the developing world), there would be no need 
for joint action or coordination for the buyers to depress prices.  Instead, buyers can achieve the same 
outcome through unilateral action, which would not necessarily be caught by the competition laws of 
the developed regimes even if pursued by all buyers.  A case based on a theory of abuse of dominance 
might face the obstacle of an absence of (final) consumer harm.  More importantly, however, for 
competition law to intervene in this contracting matter between a buyer and seller, would essentially 
amount to a form of price regulation, if the mere aim were to maintain the income of the farmer (as a 
way of indirectly protecting her right to food).  Such price regulation is problematic where the price 
has to be fixed by a government decision-maker in the context of a zero-sum conflict between the 
buyer and the farmer, since a higher price unequivocally hurts the buyer and helps the farmer.  From 
the domestic perspective of developing nations, such protection of farm incomes attracts lobbying 
efforts and other forms of rent-seeking behaviour.  From the global perspective, in the absence of 
some coordination across jurisdictions, the buyer can always threaten to go elsewhere in the face of 
such an effort at price control. 
Yet, as De Schutter and Ganesh
74
 recognize, there is a dynamic element to the buyer-supplier 
relationship even in the context of a traditional primary sector, such as farming or agriculture.  For 
example, de Schutter points out that depressed incomes for developing nation farmers affect their 
ability to make investments for the future “and climb up the value chain”75.  Moreover, intermediate 
buyers who wish to place agricultural products for sale on western markets must comply with 
increasingly more strict requirements relating to “hygiene, food safety and traceability”, both of a 
public and private nature.  Given requirements for traceability, such safety standards are impossible to 
satisfy without the cooperation of the farmer who produces the primary product.  Therefore, the buyer 
must work together with the farmer/supplier to ensure that they too have the knowledge, capacity and 
the means to satisfy such regulatory requirements, absent which the buyer may be unable to resell 
those products on western markets or be potentially subject to crippling liability.  Viewed in this way, 
we can see some similarity between the farming context and the firms in an industrialising sector that 
might require some policy support while and so long as they learn how to make that which is 
demanded on world markets.  In other words, there is a way in which competition authorities may 
structure this discussion not purely through the prism of price regulation or income protection, but in a 
way that stimulates dynamic learning that can advance both the right to food of local producers 
(thereby furthering human development goals) and the ability of buyers to resell products on world 
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markets.  While this might necessitate cooperation among local farmers, it can also contribute towards 
the maintenance of a disaggregated local economy, to the extent that it makes it unnecessary for 
foreign buyers to integrate downstream into larger agricultural holdings.  If local farmers can ensure 
compliance with regulatory standards, continuing to buy from such decentralised farmers offers buyers 
greater flexibility in responding to demand shifts compared to owning the farming facilities 
themselves
76
. 
Presented in this way, in this example also it is not entirely clear where development or innovation 
policy ends and where competition law begins.  Perhaps precisely for that reason, we might be wary 
about policy implementation or law enforcement efforts that are centered around traditional narrow 
mandate bureaucracies and private law courts.  Instead, as in the cases presented by Breznitz, some 
type of “co-evolution” between the industry and the state is required.  From the industry side, such 
institutional forms can involve consortia in which buyers help sub-contractors to develop capacities 
for resolving production problems
77.  From the state side, we can recall Breznitz’s call for the state as 
a “flexible facilitating agent” and in that context a bureaucracy that is more fluid and flexible and 
closer to industry
78
.  Part of that flexibility might involve a bias against regulatory regimes that are too 
specialised and focused on intermediate goals such as competition or decentralization or price 
controls, without regard to how production relationships contribute towards the ultimate policy 
objective of improving the lot of the local population, alleviating poverty and hunger and increasing 
various aspects of human development. 
In fashioning a development policy in the farming sector, an innovation policy logic would suggest 
stimulating some form of cooperation among local actors both to build capacity and to alleviate 
uncertainty associated with investments, but also stimulating problem-solving collaboration between 
local actors
79
 and their foreign buyers so that they can meet the benchmarks of world markets.  At the 
same time, a competition policy logic would urge caution about the potential effects of cooperative 
arrangements among local actors on both local new entrants and local consumers.  Moreover, a 
competition policy logic might also urge caution about excessive dependence on a single product or 
crop, or excessive dependence on a single (or a very limited number of) foreign buyer(s)
80
.  A social 
policy or human rights logic would be attentive to the income levels received by local producers both 
as a source of sustenance and as a source of investments in maintaining or elevating their ability to 
produce the kinds of goods demanded in international production networks.  It may well be both 
difficult and inadvisable to pursue these objectives in isolation or independently from each other. 
This view echoes John Ruggie’s call for a more integrated framework to the pursuit of human 
development objectives as opposed to a “narrow approach to managing the business and human rights 
agenda”81, whereby regulatory efforts are confined within separate “conceptual and (typically weak) 
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institutional box(es)”82 each pursuing a narrow mandate or logic of its own.  The co-evolving state and 
private sector institutions, on this view, must face policy trade-offs – as best as they can - as these 
trade-offs are presented, rather than leaving outcomes to fall out as imperceptible adjustments over the 
longer term to interventions guided by the logic of different regulatory or sectoral regimes.   
Institutions, Categories and Routines 
One implication of this contribution is the argument that the relationship between development and 
competition policy cannot be adequately captured either by idea of subordination (of the latter to the 
earlier) nor by compartmentalization of narrow mandate regimes.  Instead, I have argued that 
development policy cannot and should not be designed in isolation from competition law 
considerations and vice-versa.  Competition law seeks to influence the modalities of production and 
distribution of goods and services in the economy, with the aim of both increasing the size of the pie 
(over time) and influencing how the pie is ultimately shared.  The modes of production in the economy 
also influence developmental goals, such as industrialization, the ability to take part in world 
production networks and the take home rewards for producers.  Competition policy aimed at atomized 
production relationships can undermine such goals.  At the same time, development policy that aims to 
promote cooperation and shield firm investments from some uncertainty can be captured by 
concentrated local economic and political interests, this again at the expense of developmental goals.  
While we might agree with Singh that competition policy must take into account dynamic effects, this 
does not mean that competition policy plays second fiddle in the developmental stage. 
Based on the foregoing, it is encouraging that developing nations in the past few decades, either of 
their own accord or instigated by international donors or partners, have been adopting competition 
regimes and building implementation capacity in this field.  It is also encouraging that a number of 
different international fora have provided focused settings for discussion of competition policy 
problems, including not only the initiatives within the OECD and UNCTAD, but also more recently 
the ICN, as a dedicated competition forum (“all antitrust, all of the time” as explained by one of its 
promotors)
83
.  Importantly, apart from discussions about common problems, implementation strategies 
and enforcement cooperation, these fora also have a specific focus on the building up of regulatory 
capacities of decision-makers within emerging and developing economies.  
However, despite this increased attention to competition law issues within a variety of settings, there is 
an emergent consensus that these international fora do not provide a sufficiently focused exploration 
of the relationship between developmental goals and competition problems or competition law 
implementation.   In noting the paucity of specific initiatives within the ICN to address development 
related competition issues, Monti observes that in the realm of rules on unilateral conduct (or abuse of 
dominance) “the sole [ICN] effort devoted specifically to the needs of developing and transition 
economies is a document on recommended practices on state-created monopolies” with relatively 
unhelpful exhortations
84
.  Elsewhere I have argued that discussions at the annual ICN conferences are 
not always focused on topics that are of relevance to a broad range of member authorities from 
developing nations, nor are they conducted in a way that gives voice to the specific problems and 
experiences of such authorities
85
.  With respected to UNCTAD, Monti observes that the norms 
elaborated within that much older competition forum, beginning with the ‘Set of Multilaterally Agreed 
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Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices’ from 1980 and up to 
the Model Law released in 2003 and revised in 2010, do not appear to have evolved much in that 
period.  Moreover these normative documents contain few, if any, accommodations or specific 
modifications tailored to the development context
86
.  While it may be that the UNCTAD competition 
conference does a better job at giving voice to developing nation problems and experiences
87
, a 
relatively recent report by the UNCTAD Secretariat on abuse of dominance contains a limited number 
of concrete “examples of competition enforcement contributing to development”88. 
These limitations reflect a wider problem with international antitrust cooperation instruments, namely 
the tendency for guidance to new jurisdictions (whether through model rules of fora such as the ICN, 
UNCTAD or the OECD or through projects sponsored by donors and partners such as the World Bank 
or the EU) to be organised around existing antitrust categories that have emerged in different 
circumstances in mature regimes (ie, the US and EU).  Moreover, such guidance, being focused 
narrowly on competition aspects, may not address some of the issues raised in this paper.  This in turn 
can lead officials from developing nations to view their world through those categories, influencing in 
turn how they normatively perceive their local experiences and examples.  To take one example, 
Brusick and Evenett argue that most of the advice from industrialised-country experts to “nascent” 
competition authorities in the developing world is to give preference to actions against cartels (or 
horizontal restraints among competitors) and competition advocacy
89
.  Hearing it repeated over-and-
over again that cartels are the bane of antitrust, how does a competition official fine-tune his 
competition advocacy message relating to development or exporting clusters of firms of the kind 
mentioned earlier in this article? 
There is another way in which such category based guidance from industrialized country experts can 
limit the ability of competition decision-makers to learn to respond to their local development context 
and goals, namely by encrusting decision-making procedures and establishing analytical routines.  
From the domain of decision-making procedures, one example is the tendency to view competition 
enforcement as the establishment of violations and liability that is to be decided by a courts or a 
similar adjudicative tribunal.
90
  Similarly, expert guidance may lead to the establishment of certain 
analytical routines within nascent antitrust authorities, such as market definition, the use of the SSNIP 
test and so on, without any discussion or appreciation of how, if at all, these relate to the development 
context and objectives
91
.  Such tendencies might both rigidify and isolate the antitrust regime, impair 
communication across different areas of state intervention and, as a result, constrain precisely the type 
of flexible state-industry co-evolution that may be necessary to respond to development objectives and 
contexts.   
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Concluding Remarks 
Development theory in its inception tended to offer quite broad prescriptions about policy – starting 
from the belief in macroeconomic demand management policies (and their analogues in the 
development context) to the belief that unleashing price signals is a panacea for achieving economic 
and human development.  The failures of such broad-brush prescriptions, together with evidence that 
successful developers did not fit neatly into existing categories has brought closer attention to both the 
“institutional underpinnings” of market economies and to the role that the state could play in 
facilitating private economic action.  Regulatory regimes such as competition law or financial 
regulation are now firmly on the agenda of international development donors and, as a result, also on 
the books in many developing nations.  Yet, particularly given the conditionality mindset of donors, 
these regulatory regimes tend to be viewed as boxes to be ticked in return for continued support.  As a 
result they are often implemented independently from each other, as self-sufficient regimes with 
narrow mandates and specialised bureaucracies, and without consideration of what role they can play 
in the fashioning and implementation of development policy.  In such a setting, it may well be 
legitimate to ask whether a developing nation should prioritise developmental policies over the 
enforcement of competition law during the developmental stage if there is a conflict between those 
two regimes in a particular case.   
By pointing to the growing recognition of the need to take account of dynamic effects in competition 
law and by seeking to identify the common ground in the various interpretations of the successes of 
the late developers in East Asia, this contribution has argued that the boundary between development 
policy and competition law is quite porous.  If firms in a development sector need to coordinate their 
decision-making, the decision-maker needs to understand why such a need arises.  An exporting cartel 
is not likely to be a successful strategy given that producers in developing nations tend to be price-
takers in world markets.  A cartel aimed at domestic consumers purely to protect profits and prices of 
domestic firms would ordinarily be treated with some scepticism, or at the very least the policy-maker 
might seek to understand if other alternatives are available to deliver dynamic benefits over time.  The 
need for learning spillovers across firm boundaries might be treated as a legitimate objective, but even 
here the policy-maker would need to learn herself so as to understand whether firms are indeed 
improving their capacity to participate in world markets, or whether the coordination is, or becomes, a 
guise for collusive conduct.  The challenge then for nascent authorities, donors, advisers and 
international antitrust fora is not simply to build isolated competition enforcement systems based on 
familiar categories, but to contribute to the process of industry co-evolution with all aspects of state 
intervention, allowing competition (and other) considerations to be appropriately integrated into 
policies aiming to facilitate economic development and other broader social goals. 
 
 
                      
 
This EUI Working Paper is published in the 
framework of an ERC-funded project hosted at the 
European University Institute. 
 
